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The Foreign Tax Credit War 
Bret Wells* 
 
The government has been involved in a sustained war against 
objectionable foreign tax credit transactions. This war has caused the 
U.S. foreign tax credit regime to be riddled with complexity that spawns 
incoherent outcomes. The complexity contained in section 901 was 
created due to a legitimate concern: the threats posed by objectionable 
transactions that artificially generate excess foreign tax credits 
represent real policy problems. Since at least 1975, Congress and the 
Treasury Department have been convinced that the cross-crediting of 
excess foreign tax credits arising from “objectionable transactions” 
required a response in addition to simply relying on section 904. Thus, it 
is understandable that Congress and the Treasury Department would 
seek to redefine the foreign tax credit eligibility standards in response to 
transactions that generate foreign tax credits in objectionable ways. 
However, the historical record indicates that Congress and the Treasury 
Department ran roughshod over section 901 and used a scorched earth 
approach in their war against objectionable foreign tax credit 
transactions. The result is that the U.S. foreign tax credit regime is a 
“byzantine structure of staggering complexity.”1 In the rush to enact 
reforms, ill-conceived provisions were enacted that should not have 
been enacted. 
Objectionable foreign tax credit transactions needed principled 
responses, and principled responses were enacted in the midst of a 
scattergun attack on these objectionable transactions. However, the 
United States must have a principled foreign tax credit regime that 
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 1. See infra note 24. 
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balances the need to prevent international double income taxation with 
the need to prevent abusive transactions. This Article addresses the 
disallowance provisions that have been added to section 901 as part of 
the government’s war against objectionable foreign tax credit 
transactions and assesses which of those provisions serve a continuing 
policy objective and which do not. This Article argues that U.S. tax law 
would be greatly improved if section 901 embodied a principled 
approach and if redundant provisions that create incoherent outcomes 
were removed. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The government has waged a sustained war against objectionable 
foreign tax credit transactions.2 The impacts of these hostilities have 
caused the U.S. foreign tax credit regime to be riddled with 
enormous complexity. It is now time to take a step back and 
reconsider the fundamental interest that a foreign tax credit regime 
seeks to promote and the fundamental interest that the U.S. 
government has in preventing cross-crediting of excess foreign tax 
credits generated from objectionable transactions. This inquiry is 
needed so that the U.S. foreign tax credit regime can be made 
more  coherent. 
As an initial matter, it is important to note that the U.S. foreign 
tax credit regime has grown in importance due to the policy choices 
of other developed nations. In the formative debates about 
international tax policy, tax scholars predicted that all nations would 
adopt worldwide income tax regimes as they moved from semi-
developed status to developed nation status.3 But, in fact, the world 
has moved in the opposite direction, with most of the major U.S. 
trading partners adopting territorial tax regimes.4 A territorial tax 
regime does not impose meaningful taxation over extra-territorial 
profits, and so international double income taxation is structurally 
avoided with such a regime.5 Consequently, the continued adherence 
by the United States to a worldwide income tax regime represents an 
increasingly divergent tax system with important implications for the 
 
 2. The term “foreign tax credit generator” is of recent vintage. See I.R. 2007-73, IRS 
Issues Regulations on Transactions Designed to Artificially Generate Foreign Tax Credits 
(Mar. 29, 2007) (using the term “foreign tax credit generator transactions”) But, as will be 
demonstrated in this Article, the policy motivations that engender hostility to artificial 
generation of foreign tax credits has represented a significant force in the evolution of existing 
law for at least forty years. 
 3. League of Nations Econ. & Fiscal Comm., Report on Double Taxation to the 
Financial Committee of the League of Nations, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S. 73 F. 19 at 
51 (1923). 
 4. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 112th Cong., BACKGROUND 
AND SELECTED ISSUES RELATED TO THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM AND SYSTEMS 
THAT EXEMPT FOREIGN BUSINESS INCOME, JCX-33-11 (2011) (analyzing nine major U.S. 
trading partners that provide for an exemption system); see also Staff of the Joint Committee 
on Taxation, Present Law and Issues in U.S. Taxation of Cross-Border Income, JCX-42-11 
(2011) (reviewing policy considerations between a territorial and worldwide tax system). 
 5. See supra note 4. 
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U.S. foreign tax credit regime. Multinational enterprises located in 
territorial tax regimes have no meaningful risk of international 
double income taxation. In contrast, U.S. multinational enterprises 
must rely on a coherently functioning U.S. foreign tax credit regime 
to avoid international double income taxation.6 Respected scholars 
have forcefully argued that worldwide taxation of resident 
multinational enterprises is the best policy choice for our country,7 
 
 6. Professor Kingson succinctly made this point in 1981 as follows: 
The United States uses the credit method, under which a residence country taxes 
foreign income but reduces its tax by taxes paid to the source country. . . . On the 
other hand, continental European countries generally use the exemption method, 
which exempts from corporate tax dividends or branch profits in respect of direct 
investment abroad. In that case, regardless of the source country tax rate, the 
residence country has no revenue interst in the investment. By reason of that 
difference, the residence conflict [with source country taxation] for Germany and 
other exemption method countries is not complicated, as it is in the 
United States . . . . 
Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1164–
65 (1981). 
 7. See e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen Shay, Formulary 
Apportionment in the U.S. International Income Tax System: Putting Lipstick on a Pig?, 36 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 8 (2014); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen Shay, 
Designing a U.S. Exemption System for Foreign Income When the Treasury is Empty, 13 FLA. TAX 
REV. 397, 406–12 (2012); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Understanding Consolidated Returns, 12 
FLA. TAX REV. 125, 182 (2012); Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., Consolidating Foreign Subsidiaries, 
11 FLA L. REV. 143, 195–96 (2011); J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen Shay, 
Reinvegiorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International Dimensions, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 
437, 528–61 (2008); Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Reform and 
Simplification of the U.S. Foreign Tax Credit Rules, 31 TAX NOTES INT’L 1177, 1207 (2003); 
Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Getting Serious About Curtailing 
Deferral of US Tax On Foreign Source Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 458 (1999); Reuven S. 
Avi-Yonah, To End Deferral as We Know It: Simplification Potential of Check- the-Box, 74 TAX 
NOTES 219, 224 (1997); Asim Bhansali, Globalizing Consolidated Taxation of United States 
Multinationals, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1422 (1996); Daniel J. Frisch, The Economics of 
International Tax Policy: Some Old and New Approaches, 47 TAX NOTES 581 (1990); Jane G. 
Gravelle, Foreign Tax Provisions of the American Jobs Act of 1996, 72 TAX NOTES 1165 (1996); 
Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational 
Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 75 (1993); John McDonald, Comment, Anti-Deferral 
Deferred: A Proposal for the Reform of International Tax Law, 16 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 248, 
281 (1995); Peter Merrill & Carol Dunahoo, ‘Runaway Plant’ Legislation: Rhetoric and 
Reality, 72 TAX NOTES 221, 221 (1996); Stephen E. Shay, Revisiting U.S. Anti-Deferral 
Rules, 74 TAXES 1042, 1061 (1996); Joseph Isenbergh, Perspectives on the Deferral of U.S. 
Taxation of the Earnings of Foreign Corporations, 66 TAXES 1062, 1063 (1988); Lee Sheppard, 
Last Corporate Taxpayer Out the Door, Please Turn Out the Lights, 82 TAX NOTES 941, 
944  (1999). 
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and this discussion has generated a spirited rebuttal by other 
respected scholars.8 
Instead of joining that larger debate, this Article assumes that the 
United States will continue to assert residency-based worldwide 
taxation (either on a current or deferred basis) on the foreign 
income of U.S. multinational enterprises. In this context, what 
should the U.S. foreign tax credit regime look like? Even though this 
Article assumes that residency-based worldwide taxation remains a 
fixture of U.S. international tax policy for the foreseeable future, the 
fact that most other countries have opted for a territorial tax regime 
provides an important backdrop for evaluating the U.S. foreign tax 
credit regime. Said differently, now that the major trading partners 
of the United States do not assert meaningful extra-territorial 
taxation over active foreign business income, the United States 
simply must have a “coherent”9 U.S. foreign tax credit regime that 
does not create unnecessary instances of international double income 
taxation.10 But when is international double income taxation 
 
 8. Mihir A. Desai, C. Gritz Foley & James R. Hines, Jr., Domestic Effects of the Foreign 
Activities of U.S. Multinationals, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POLICY 181, 201 (2009); Mihir A. 
Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Old Rules and New Realities: Corporate Tax Policy in a Global 
Setting, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 937 (2004); James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax 
Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487 (2003); James R. Hines, Jr., The Case Against Deferral: A 
Deferential Reconsideration, 52 NAT’L TAX J.  385, 401–02 (1999); Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, Inc., The NFTC Foreign Income Project: International Tax Policy for the 21st Century: 
Part One: A Reconsideration of Subpart F, 1999 TNT 58-17, [9], [57], Doc. 1999-11623 
(1999); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Competition & Competitiveness: Review of NFTC Subpart F 
Report, 83 TAX NOTES 582, 582 (1999); Peter R. Merrill, A Response to Professor Avi-Yonah 
on Subpart F, 83 TAX NOTES 1802, 1802 (1999). 
 9. See Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1153 (1981) (“Coherence means, then, that each country must take into account how 
the others tax international income. . . . [O]ne tax system can take advantage of another; and 
other countries are taking that advantage of the United States. Their overtaxation limits our 
revenues; their undertaxation mocks our treaties; and their discrimination, by both law and 
unequal tax administration, blunts our competitiveness. Unfortunately, the responsibility does 
not rest entirely abroad. Precisely because tax systems do interact, United States tax decisions 
have helped create the current situation.”). 
 10. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99th Cong., General Explanation of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 at 861 (Comm. Print 1986) (“The purpose of the foreign tax credit is to 
reduce international double taxation.”). But, even though the majority view has been clear 
about the need for and purpose of the U.S. foreign tax credit, there has been an ongoing 
debate since at least 1934 about whether the allowance of a tax credit is necessary as the 
following representative excerpt so indicates: 
Under the Revenue Acts of 1913, 1916, and 1917 a taxpayer was not entitled to 
any credit for taxes paid to a foreign country. These early acts permitted taxes paid 
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“necessary” and when is it “inappropriate?” Greater focus and 
urgency should be brought to bear on this question because the 
United States must have a coherent foreign tax credit regime given 
the policy choices of other nations. 
The original intent of the U.S. foreign tax credit regime is not 
hard to understand. In order to mitigate against the perceived evils 
of international double income taxation, section 901(b)(1) has 
existed since 191811 and provides U.S. foreign tax credit relief for 
any income and excess profits12 taxes paid or accrued to a foreign 
 
to a foreign country to be deducted only from gross income, which was also the rule 
applied in the case of State, county, and municipal taxes. 
Our subcommittee recommended the elimination of the foreign tax credit and a 
return to the deduction system permitted under the early revenue acts, which 
system, of course, returns substantially greater revenue than the present method. 
The Treasury Department, however, was of the opinion that the present method 
was fair and should be continued, pointing out that “the United States, to avoid 
burdensome double taxation and to encourage foreign trade, should therefore allow 
an offsetting credit against its own income tax.” 
See J. S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS at 373 
(1938). Regardless of its origin, the allowance of a foreign tax credit in lieu of a deduction 
continues to be debated by scholars to this day. Compare Daniel N. Shaviro, The Case Against 
Foreign Tax Credits, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 65 (2011); Kimberly Clausing and Daniel N. 
Shaviro, A Burden-Neutral Shift from Foreign Tax Creditability to Deductibility?, 64 TAX L. 
REV. 431 (2011), with Reuven Avi-Yonah, No Country is an Island: Is a Radical Rethinking of 
International Taxation Needed?, UNIV. OF MICH. L. SCH., U of Michigan Public Law 
Research Paper No. 380 (2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2389979. Notwithstanding this academic debate, no serious legislative effort has occurred 
since 1934 to change the creditability of foreign income taxes, thus making the desire to avoid 
double international income taxation one of the longest and most fundamental aspects of the 
U.S. international tax regime. 
 11. See REVENUE ACT OF 1918, PUB. L. 65-254, §222(A), 40 STAT. 1057, 1073 (as 
codified in I.R.C. §901(b)). Initially, the U.S. provided no foreign tax credit relief under the 
income tax laws of 1909 and 1913. See generally REVENUE ACT OF 1909, CH. 6, 36 STAT. 11; 
REVENUE ACT OF 1913, CH. 16, 38 STAT. 114, at 172. But, the income tax rates were 
admittedly small, so the cost of not providing U.S. foreign tax credit relief at that time was not 
significant. However, with the advent of World War I, tax rates increased sharply in the U.S. 
and other countries. Stanley S. Surrey, The United States Taxation of Foreign Income, 1 J.L. & 
ECON. 72, 73 n.3 (1959). With increasing tax rates in both foreign countries and the United 
States, the cost of international double taxation became a significant cost to U.S. taxpayers. Id. 
at 73. As a result, in 1918, Congress adopted a foreign tax credit regime. The creation of a 
broad-based foreign tax credit was principally the invention of Thomas S. Adams, an economic 
advisor to the Treasury Department at the time. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, 
The “Original Intent” of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1038–39 
n.71 (1997). 
 12. Excess profits taxes were imposed on only a portion of total income in excess of a 
given rate of return. See W.G. McAdoo, Treasury Secretary, Income, Excess Profits, and Estate 
Taxes: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means 15 (1918) (“By an excess-profits 
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country. As one of the longest-held U.S. international tax principles, 
Congress and the judiciary have recognized for almost a century that 
a robust U.S. foreign tax credit regime is an important feature of 
U.S. tax law whose fundamental purpose is to prevent international 
double income taxation.13 In deciding which foreign taxes represent 
income and excess profits taxes eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit 
relief, the Supreme Court in Biddle14 established that this inquiry 
would be made using U.S. principles.15 In working out these U.S. 
 
tax we mean a tax upon profits in excess of a given return upon capital.”); see also GEORGE E. 
HOLMES, FEDERAL INCOME TAX, WAR-PROFITS AND EXCESS-PROFITS TAXES 14, 136 (1920) 
(stating excess profits taxes were imposed on only a portion of total income). The statute also 
refers to “war profits taxes.” For an historical definition of a war profits tax, see W.G. McAdoo, 
Treasury Secretary, Income, Excess Profits, and Estate Taxes: Hearings Before the House Comm. 
on Ways and Means 15 (1918) (“By a war-profits tax we mean a tax upon profits in excess of 
those realized before the war.”). By World War II, war-profits taxes were viewed as simply a 
subcategory of excess profits taxes. See KENNETH JAMES CURRAN, EXCESS PROFITS TAXATION 
at 2 (AM. COUNCIL ON PUB. AFFS. 1943) (“[T]he term ‘excess profits tax’ [today is used] to 
describe any levy that is confined to a segment of a taxpayer’s income that is considered 
excessive, no matter by what standard of measurement it is determined.”). Thus, for clarity to 
the modern reader, this paper discusses income taxes and excess profits taxes. 
 13. Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 7 (1932) (the foreign tax credit is 
designed “to mitigate the evil of double taxation”); Am. Chicle Co. v. United States, 316 U.S. 
450, 452 (1942) (“the purpose [of the foreign tax credit] is to avoid double taxation”); 
United States v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, 493 U.S. 132, 139 (1989) (“The [legislative] 
history of the indirect credit clearly demonstrates that the credit was intended to protect a 
domestic parent from double taxation of its income.”); Comm’r v. Am. Metal Co., 221 F.2d 
134, 137 (2d Cir. 1955) (“The primary objective of [the foreign tax credit regime] is to 
prevent double taxation and a secondary objective is to encourage American foreign trade.”). 
The legislative history is consistent and longstanding. See H. REP. 1337, 83RD CONG., 2D SESS. 
at 76 (1954) (“The [foreign tax credit] provision was originally designed to produce 
uniformity of tax burden among United States taxpayers, irrespective of whether they were 
engaged in business in the United States or engaged in business abroad.”); S. REP. NO. 558, 
73RD CONG 2D SESS. at 39 (1934) (“The present [foreign tax] credit . . . does relieve the 
taxpayer from a double tax upon his foreign income.”); H.R. REP. 767, 65TH CONG., 2D SESS. 
(1918), 1939-1 C.B. (Part 2) 86, 93 (in explaining the rationale for a foreign tax credit, the 
legislative history stated as follows: “[w]ith the corresponding high rates imposed by certain 
foreign countries that taxes levied in such countries in addition to the taxes levied in the 
United States upon citizens of the United States place a very sever burden upon 
such citizens”). 
 14. Biddle v. Comm’r, 302 U.S. 573, 579 (1938); see also United States v. Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co., 493 U.S. 132, 145 (1989) (reaffirming the approach contained 
in Biddle). 
 15. Although Biddle dealt with whether U.S. or foreign law should be used to 
determine the identity of the technical taxpayer of the foreign tax, subsequent cases used the 
Supreme Court’s statement that U.S. law, not foreign law, should broadly be used for purposes 
of applying the U.S. foreign tax credit rules including with respect to the question of whether 
a foreign levy was an income tax. See Comm’r v. Am. Metal Co., 221 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1955). 
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principles,16 early cases and IRS rulings held that taxes levied on 
“imputed income” could be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief 
if net income was attempted to be taxed and was so taxed.17 In 
general, these early cases and IRS rulings took an expansive view of 
credit eligibility, allowing the foreign country considerable latitude 
to define the manner in which a formulary tax arrived at the net 
income it intended to tax.18 Thus, although the diversity of foreign 
taxes made the pre-1983 case law inconsistent at the outer edges, the 
substantive law was based on a principle-based approach: if the 
foreign tax was designed to tax net income and predominantly did 
tax net income in practice, then U.S. foreign tax credit relief was 
appropriate in order to prevent international double 
income taxation.19 
Yet, a basic tension exists within the foreign tax credit regime, 
and the outworking of this basic tension has created increasing 
complexity and risks of international double income taxation. The 
basic tension at the core of the US foreign tax credit regime relates 
to the question of how the U.S. government should address the 
problem of cross-crediting excess foreign tax credits generated in 
objectionable transactions. In the cross-crediting fact pattern, the 
central question is whether one should think about prevention of 
international double income taxation narrowly (i.e., on only that 
 
 16. Some have called for a broader allowance of creditability of taxes beyond foreign 
income taxes. See Joseph Isenbergh, The Foreign Tax Credit: Royalties, Subsidies, and Creditable 
Taxes, 39 TAX L. REV. 227, 230–31 (1984). 
 17. See Burke Bros. v. Comm’r, 20 B.T.A. 1657 (1930) (Indian tax on goat skins was 
calculated based on the difference between the average sales price of goat skins in their 
destination from the average sales price in Calcutta and reduced by certain transportation 
expenses; held, the presumptive tax was an income tax entitled to U.S. foreign tax credit 
relief);Keen v. Comm’r, 15 B.T.A. 1243 (1929) (a tax on presumed income was calculated on 
nondomiciled persons who maintained a residence in France; income was presumed to be a 
minimum of seven times the rental value of their residence; held, French tax was an income tax 
eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief); Hatmaker v. Comm’r, 15 B.T.A. 1044 (1929) 
(same); Rev. Rul. 53-272, 193-2 C.B. 56 (a Haitian tax was imposed on business income 
computed by multiplying the rental value of the land and buildings by five and assessing an 
income tax on this imputed income; IRS held this was an attempt to tax presumed income and 
was eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief); Rev. Rul. 56-658, 1956-2 C.B. 501 (Cuban tax 
on sugar mill operators assessed based on the amount of sugar produced times the average 
price for sugar and reduced by 60% for “deemed expenses” held that this presumptive tax was 
creditable as an attempt to tax income). 
 18. See ELISABETH OWENS, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT: A STUDY OF THE CREDIT FOR 
FOREIGN TAXES UNDER UNITED STATES INCOME TAX LAW 43–46 (1961). 
 19. Id. at 33–46. 
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particular item-of-income and its attributable foreign taxes on a 
stand-alone basis without cross-crediting excess taxes), or whether 
mitigation of international double income taxation should be 
evaluated on an overall basis (i.e., by aggregating foreign income and 
foreign taxes in some fashion). Congress and the Treasury 
Department have provided multiple responses to the cross-crediting 
phenomenon, and this multiplicity of responses has created 
considerable complexity. 
As one longstanding answer to the central question posed by the 
cross-crediting phenomenon, Congress has formulated aggregate 
foreign tax credit limitation rules to regulate the scope and extent of 
cross-crediting of excess foreign tax credits since 1921.20  Although 
these section 904 foreign tax credit limitation rules have changed in 
important ways over time,21 the overall and separate limitation 
 
 20. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 at 862 (Comm. Print 1986) (“Congress recognized that, in certain 
situations, cross-crediting should not be permitted when it would distort the purpose of the 
foreign tax credit limitation. Congress believed that, in some cases, the ability of U.S. persons 
to average foreign tax rates for foreign tax credit limitation purposes and thereby reduce or 
eliminate the residual U.S. tax on their foreign income had undesirable consequences.”). 
 21. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND 
ANALYSIS OF PRESENT-LAW RULES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TAXATION SCHEDULED 
FOR A HEARING BEFORE THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS at II.A.5.c, JCX-40-99 
(June 28, 1999). Between 1918 and 1921, there were no limitations on the use of foreign tax 
credits. See id. at II.A.5.c, IV.B.2 (1999). As a result, taxpayers could utilize foreign tax credits 
to fully reduce their residual U.S. tax liability on both domestic source income and foreign 
source income. See id. at II.A.5.b, IV.B.2 (1999). However, in order to protect the U.S. tax 
jurisdiction’s right to tax U.S. source income, Congress in 1921 enacted an overall foreign tax 
credit limitation that limited the usage of foreign tax credits to the U.S. taxpayer’s U.S. tax 
liability on net foreign source income. See REVENUE ACT OF 1921, CH. 136, § 222(A)(5), 
238(A), 904(A), 42 STAT. 227, 249, 258. Although not further discussed in this article, this 
limitation regime has taken various forms. In 1932, Congress decreed that taxpayers were 
required to use the lesser of an overall or per-country limitation. See Revenue Act of 1932, CH. 
209, § 131(B), 47 STAT. 169, 211. In 1954, the overall limitation was repealed and only the 
per-country limitation regime existed. See I.R.C. §904 (2006). In 1960, taxpayers were given 
the option to use either a per-country or an overall limitation computation. See Act of Sept. 
14, 1960, CH. PUB. L. NO. 86-780, § 1(A), 74 STAT. 1010. In 1976, the per-country limitation 
was repealed, and the law had come full circle to the position of 1921. See Tax Reform Act of 
1976, CH. PUB. L. NO. 94-455, § 1031, § 904, 90 STAT. 1610, 1620–24. In 1986, the foreign 
tax credit basket rules were instituted along with an overall limitation regime to form the basis 
of current law. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, CH. PUB. L. NO. 99-514, § 1201, § 904(d), 100 
STAT. 2085, 2520-28. Effective for years beginning in 2006, the American Jobs Creation Act 
of 2004 reduced the number of foreign tax credit baskets down to two baskets: the “passive 
basket” and the “general basket.” See American Jobs Creation Act, PUB. L. NO. 108-357, 118 
STAT. 1418 (2004). 
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regimes of section 904(a) and section 904(d) can be summarized as 
follows: the U.S. foreign tax credit regime is intended to prevent 
international double income taxation on an aggregate basis except to 
the extent necessary to protect the U.S. taxing jurisdiction on U.S. 
domestic source income and to protect against inappropriate cross-
crediting of taxes against low-taxed passive basket foreign 
source income.22 
Since at least 1975,23 Congress has believed that section 904 is 
not a sufficient response in and of itself against perceived 
manipulation of the amount of allowable U.S. foreign tax credits 
generated in objectionable transactions. Thus, although section 904 
expresses an overall or aggregate approach to the cross-crediting 
phenomenon, Congress has simultaneously pursued a parallel effort 
to outright disallow foreign tax credit relief for taxes generated in 
specific transactions where the amount of U.S. foreign tax credits 
generated in such transactions was perceived to be unreasonable. 
The ravages of this war have left their mark, causing the U.S. foreign 
tax credit regime to be described as “a byzantine structure of 
staggering complexity.”24  
The war against objectionable foreign tax credit transactions that 
generate artificially high amounts of U.S. foreign tax credits reached 
an important milestone in 2010 when Congress codified the 
economic substance doctrine in section 7701(o).25 Section 7701(o) 
 
 22. I.R.C. § 904(a), (d) (2010). 
 23. In the author’s view, war was declared with the enactment of I.R.C. § 907, and we 
have been witnessing continuing hostilities since then as the war shifts to other terrain, but the 
basic policy concern with abusive cross-crediting remains the central feature that has caused the 
law to evolve. 
 24. BITTKER & EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 15.21[1][a] (7th ed. Supp. 2014); see also Robert J. Peroni, J. Clifton 
Fleming, Jr. & Stephen E. Shay, Reform and Simplification of the U.S. Foreign Tax Credit 
Rules, 31 TAX NOTES INT’L 1177, 1200 (2003). To be faithful to this complexity, the author 
has sought to provide robust footnotes for the authorities that provide illumination for the 
tortured history that has led to the current complexity, but consistent with the thesis of this 
Article, the main text has sought to provide a straightforward articulation of the fundamental 
principles that should shape I.R.C. § 901 in the future. 
 25. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, PUB. L. NO. 111-148, § 
1409(a). Codification of the economic substance doctrine was driven by a concern over tax 
shelters generally and not simply international foreign tax credit arbitrage transactions. See 
STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE 
PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL 2010 BUDGET PROPOSAL PART TWO: 
BUSINESS TAX PROVISIONS, at 36 (2009). However, even though section 7701(o) was 
intended as a broader anti-abuse provision, it was intended to also address foreign tax credit 
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codifies a broad anti-abuse rule that applies throughout the U.S. 
income tax laws.26 Importantly, section 7701(o) makes clear that a 
taxpayer must have a substantial business purpose in order to claim 
tax benefits, including tax benefits arising from foreign tax credits. 
Furthermore, instead of providing a safe-harbor profit threshold, 
section 7701(o)(2)(A) requires that a transaction’s expected nontax 
profit potential must be substantial in comparison to its expected tax 
benefits in order for the taxpayer’s profit motive to constitute a 
substantial business purpose. Section 7701(o)(5)(D) allows the 
economic substance doctrine to be applied to a single transaction or 
to a series of transactions, thus clarifying that the government has the 
ability to disaggregate transactions and test the business purpose of 
each transaction step individually.27 Section 7701(o)(2)(B) requires 
the Treasury Department to issue regulations (which as of yet it has 
not done)28 to treat foreign taxes as an expense for purposes of 
 
generator transactions and thus represents another bulwark that potentially impacts the 
taxpayer’s eligibility to claim foreign tax credit relief in a meaningful way. See STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE 
PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION 
WITH THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT”, at 152–53 (2010). 
 26. A discussion of the codification of the economic substance doctrine outside of its 
impact in the foreign tax credit arena is beyond the scope of this Article and has received 
significant scholarly attention elsewhere. See, e.g., Karen C. Burke, Reframing Economic 
Substance, 31 VA. TAX REV. 271 (2011); Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Living With the Codified 
Economic Substance Doctrine, 128 TAX NOTES 731 (Aug. 16, 2010); Bret Wells, Economic 
Substance Doctrine: How Codification Changes Decided Cases, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 411 (2010). 
 27. The legislative history states that this provision “does not alter the court’s ability to 
aggregate, disaggregate, or otherwise recharacterize a transaction when applying the doctrine,” 
thus by implication suggesting that a court should exercise this authority. See STAFF OF JOINT 
COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE 
PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION 
WITH THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT”, at 153 (2010). For cases 
that favorably allowed a bifurcation approach, see generally ACM P’ship v. Comm’r, 157 F.3d 
231, 256 n. 48 (3d Cir. 1998); James v. Comm’r, 899 F.2d 905, 910 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The 
only transactions at issue in this case are the purported sales by the Communications Group to 
the joint ventures. These sales cannot be legitimized merely because they were on the 
periphery of some legitimate transactions.”); Karr v. Comm’r, 924 F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 
1991) (“The activities of the other entities involved in exploiting the Koppelman process, 
however, cannot necessarily be attributed to POGA [the taxpayer].”); Long Term Capital 
Holdings v. United States 330 F. Supp. 2d 122 (D. Conn. 2004), aff’d, 150 F. App’x 40 (2d 
Cir. 2005). 
 28. In Notice 2010-65, 2010-40 I.R.B. 411, the IRS indicated its intention to issue 
implementing regulations but that “[i]n the interim, the enactment of the provision does not 
restrict the ability of the courts to consider the appropriate treatment of foreign taxes in 
economic substance cases.” 
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calculating the reasonably expected pre-tax profit potential of a 
transaction. Section 7701(o) is a principled approach for regulating 
the abusive generation of excess foreign tax credits. 
Unfortunately, prior to the enactment of section 7701(o), the 
Treasury Department and Congress adopted a number of ad hoc 
responses that were designed to attack objectionable foreign tax 
credit transactions,29 and the result is that inferior and redundant 
disallowance provisions still clutter section 901. The added 
complexity of these obsolete anti-abuse bulwarks add a hodge-podge 
of substantive requirements that needlessly creates a risk of 
international double income taxation in nonobjectionable situations.  
It is time to repeal these obsolete provisions because incoherent 
foreign tax credit outcomes should not be tolerated when more 
targeted and more principled solutions already adequately address 
these objectionable foreign tax credit transactions.30  
In the following Section, this Article addresses the pre-section 
7701(o) effort to disallow foreign tax credit relief for taxes generated 
in objectionable transactions and evaluates which of these 
predecessor provisions serve a continuing purpose and which do not. 
Although the law in this area is nuanced, complex, and at times 
incoherent, the thesis of this Article is straightforward: U.S. tax law 
would be greatly improved if section 901 embodied a principled 
approach and if obsolete and incoherent aspects of section 901 were 
removed. Furthermore, where the foreign tax credit disallowance 
 
 29. The synthesis of the evolution of the law in the U.S. foreign tax credit regime and 
its ad hoc nature is more fully discussed and explored in Part II, infra. 
 30. The following testimony is particularly relevant: 
[T]he foreign tax credit rules have been repeatedly revised and have become 
exceedingly complex. The sources of complexity are varied, but their common 
denominator in my view can best be described as the continual pursuit of technical 
perfection. Trying to make sure that the rules operate as intended is of course a 
worthy goal for any set of tax rules, but in the case of the foreign tax credit, it has 
led over time to a system that makes comprehensive compliance and administration 
nearly impossible. . . . Changes to the foreign tax credit rules, from ad hoc tweaks to 
wholesale revision, make long-term business planning difficult for U.S. businesses, 
relative to their foreign competitors. The complexity and instability of the U.S. 
foreign tax credit rules impose a material, ongoing administrative burden on 
taxpayers and the government. 
Statement of Dirk J. J. Suringa Before the House Committee on Ways & Means on the Need 
for Comprehensive Tax Reform to Help American Companies Compete in the Global Market 
and Create Jobs for American Workers (May 12, 2011), available at 2011 WTD 93-35, Tax 
Doc. 2011-10286. 
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provisions create an unnecessary risk of international double income 
taxation for U.S. multinational enterprises in situations where a U.S. 
taxpayer’s foreign income has borne foreign income taxes in 
nonobjectionable transactions, a double tax outcome represents an 
“incoherent outcome.” Such an outcome should not be tolerated 
given that needless instances of international double income taxation 
are out-of-step with the policy decisions of the major trading 
partners of the United States. As the United States becomes more 
and more isolated in its worldwide residency-based taxation of U.S. 
multinational enterprises, it simply must have a well-functioning U.S. 
foreign tax credit regime that achieves coherent outcomes. If section 
901 is to fulfill its fundamental purpose, foreign tax credit relief 
should be available except where disallowance of such relief is 
necessary to quash objectionable foreign tax credit transactions.  In 
Part II, this Article evaluates reasons that justified the added 
complexity in the foreign tax credit regime and why several of those 
reforms are no longer needed.  Part III sets forth a synthesis of how 
Congress should proceed in light of the knowledge derived from the 
content of Part II.   
II. THE KEY EPISODES IN THE FORTY YEARS’ WAR 
A. Desert Storm and the Oil Royalty Problem 
1. Overkill occasioned by the dual capacity problem 
The government declared war on objectionable transactions that 
inflated the amount of allowable U.S. foreign tax credits on March 
29, 1975,31 and the original fight was over oil—or more specifically 
over the creditability of the high extraction taxes imposed on dual 
capacity taxpayers in the natural resources extraction industry. 
During the 1960s and 1970s, foreign oil-producing governments 
(presumably in consultation with U.S. oil and gas producers) 
decided to forego charging higher royalties for the development of 
state-owned mineral interests and instead adopted special tax levies 
that had the effect of inflating the amount of U.S. foreign 
tax credits.32 
 
 31. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, §601, 89 Stat 26. 
 32. See Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 C.B. 386 (Saudi Arabia imposed a surtax equal to a 
percentage of the posted price per barrel of oil was held to be a creditable income tax); Rev. 
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Congress realized that high extraction taxes could include 
disguised oil royalties and was concerned that allowing the cross-
crediting of these high extraction taxes would lead to “artificial” and 
“excessive” amounts of U.S. foreign tax credit relief.33 Consequently, 
in 1975 Congress decided to create a new foreign tax credit 
limitation for extraction taxes by enacting section 907.34 In 1982, 
Congress modified section 907 to ensure that the maximum amount 
of creditable taxes for foreign oil and gas extraction income would 
not exceed the maximum U.S. tax rate.35 Thus, Congress’ response 
 
Rul. 68-552, 1968-2 C.B. 306 (a surtax imposed by Libya based on a posted price per barrel 
on holders of petroleum concessions was held to be a creditable income tax). These two ruling 
were revoked by the IRS in Rev. Rul. 78-63, 1978-1 C.B. 228. For a discussion of this oil 
versus royalty problem and the artificial inflation of foreign tax credit benefits that provided 
the rationale for enacting section 907, see, for example, Hearings on Foreign Tax Credits 
Claimed by U.S. Petroleum Companies before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 
95th Cong. 2 (1977) (opening statement of Benjamin Rosenthal, Chairman, H. Comm. on 
Gov’t Operations); H.R. REP. NO. 93-1502, at 61 (1974); Hearings on “Windfall” Excess 
Profits Tax Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93rd Cong. 151 (1974) (testimony of 
Treasury Secretary Shultz). A report by the United States General Accounting Office asserted 
that Rev. Rul. 55-296 “assumed the nature of a foreign aid program in the 1950s with the 
knowledge and consent of the U.S. government.” COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFF., EMD-80-86, THE FOREIGN TAX CREDIT AND U.S. ENERGY POLICY 40 
(1980). Professor Kingson, citing this report, asserted that providing foreign tax credits for 
what amounted to disguised royalties was done “in order to help that country at a time when 
direct aid was practically impossible” and later on other countries affirmatively exploited this 
technique to the detriment of the U.S. federal budget. Charles I. Kingson, The Coherence of 
International Taxation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1151, 1153, 1265–67. 
 33. H.R. 91-413, 91st CONG. 89, 107, 110 (1969) (“Your committee recognizes the 
substantial difficulties of ascertaining in these situations whether a payment which is labeled as 
a tax payment is, in fact, a tax or a royalty. It does not believe, however, that it is appropriate to 
allow these “tax payments” to offset U.S. tax which would otherwise be imposed on other 
foreign income (either from the same country or from another country.”). See also the 
following statement of Senator Long, which is illustrative of the Congressional attitude at 
that time:  
The [Saudi Arabian] king collected a royalty and he levied a tax on the companies. 
The companies concluded that they could only deduct their royalty but they were 
entitled to a tax credit if they were paying a tax. Therefore, some tax expert—and 
anybody with any brains as a tax expert would figure this one out—simply said “If 
Saudi Arabia were charging you the same amount as a tax, you would get a credit for 
it, which would be worth twice what a deduction would be worth. So why do you not 
tell the King over there that if he would assess that payment as a tax, you could afford 
to pay him a lot more, and you both would be better off, because you would owe the 
U.S. Government less?” 
121 CONG. REC. 7490 (1975) (statement by Sen. Long). 
 34. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, § 601, 89 Stat. 26. 
 35. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 211, 96 
Stat. 324. 
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to the disguised oil royalty problem posed by high extraction taxes 
was to isolate royalties into their own separate foreign tax credit 
limitation in order to prevent the cross-crediting of these taxes 
against any non-extraction income.36 In 2006, Congress simplified 
the various foreign tax credit limitation baskets37 in section 904(d) to 
provide for a general basket and a passive basket.38  
However, notwithstanding those simplification reforms that 
apply across all industries, section 907 remained unchanged. 
Consequently, the petroleum industry remained singled out for a 
specialized foreign tax credit limitation while all other industries 
benefitted from simplification.39 In 2008, Congress combined 
foreign oil and gas extraction income and foreign oil-related income 
into a new combined category called “foreign oil and gas income” 
and applied the section 907 limitations on this new combined 
category.40 The continued existence of the section 907 limitation 
regime would make sense if the specter of the historic disguised oil 
royalty problem were still present, but the reality is that this problem 
has already been addressed through the more targeted provisions set 
forth in Regulation section 1.901-2A, yet section 907 remains. 
Thus, seen in this historical context, singling out the extraction 
industry for specialized treatment is unnecessary once the disguised 
oil royalty problem has been addressed via other means and the 
remaining creditable amounts are otherwise nonobjectionable. 
To understand why section 907 no longer serves a vital policy 
goal, the regulatory changes to section 901 that redundantly 
 
 36. The nuances of the limitation rules of section 907 and how they apply to the 
interplay between “foreign oil and gas extraction income” and “foreign oil related income” are 
adequately addressed elsewhere. See Heather Crowder & Caren Shein, Energy Improvement 
and Extension Act of 2008—Throwing a Rope to the Ailing Financial Industry Tightens the 
Noose on Big Oil, 38 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 85 (2009); Javed A. Khokar, TEFRA Enacts Stricter 
Rules to Govern Taxation of Foreign Oil and Gas Income, 83 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 85 (1983). 
 37. I.R.C. §§ 904(a), (d). 
 38. This Article does not seek to reconsider these section 904 reforms for simplifying 
the limitations on the aggregate cross-crediting of foreign tax credits other than to say that 
Congress has provided only two aggregate baskets for managing the potential cross-crediting 
of taxes arising from nonobjectionable transactions and to say that section 904 is the 
appropriate place to handle cross-crediting for nonobjectionable foreign taxes. 
 39. See Crowder & Shein, supra note 36, at 97. 
 40. See PUB. L. NO. 110-343, DIV. B, § 402 (2008). Thus, although high extraction 
taxes no longer are limited to solely foreign oil and gas extraction income, they still cannot be 
cross-credited against non-oil and gas income such as income arising from the chemical 
processing businesses of integrated companies. 
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attacked the disguised oil royalty problem must be understood. Even 
though Congress enacted section 907 to attack the disguised oil 
royalty problem,41 the Treasury Department decided to join the fray 
by attacking the same problem using its regulatory authority under 
section 901. It was understood at the time the Treasury Department 
commenced its amendment of its section 901 regulations42 in order 
to redundantly attack the disguised oil royalty problem.43 At the 
 
 41. K. Dolan, Foreign Tax Credit Regulations as They Affect Petroleum Income—Post 
Mortem and Analysis, 83 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 1, 3–6 (1983). 
 42. On November 17, 1980, the Treasury Department issued temporary regulations 
that articulated formal criteria that a foreign tax would be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit 
relief if and only if the foreign tax was equivalent to an income tax in the United States sense, 
and for this test to be met the foreign tax must meet three formalistic tests (the gross receipts 
test, the realization test, and the net income test). T.D. 7739, Treas. Reg. § 4.901-2(c), 45 
Fed. Reg. 75,647 (Nov. 17, 1980). For an analysis of these temporary regulations and their 
impact on prior law, see Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Comm’r, 104 T.C. 256, 285 (1995). The 
effect of the 1980 regulations was that a levy paid by a petroleum company to a mineral-
owning foreign government could be denied in its entirety if the effective tax rate for 
petroleum taxpayers were significantly higher than those imposed on nonpetroleum taxpayers. 
T.D. 7739, Treas. Reg. § 4.901-2(d), 45 Fed. Reg. 75,647 (Nov. 17, 1980). Prior case law 
had determined that foreign taxes represented income tax if they were “substantial[ly] 
equivalent” in nature to the US income tax regime.  See, e.g., New York & Honduras Rosario 
Mining Co. v. Comm’r, 168 F.2d 745, 747 (2d Cir. 1948), rev’g. and remanding 8 T.C. 1232 
(1947).  However, on April 5, 1983, the Treasury Department stated that a foreign levy would 
be eligible for US foreign tax credit relief if an only if the “predominant character” of the 
foreign levy was that of an income tax in the US sense, and these final regulations left the 
underlying formalistic three-pronged test for creditability essentially unchanged. Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 14,641 (Apr. 5, 1983); Kevin D. Dolan, General 
Standards of Creditability Under §§ 901 and 903 Final Regulations—New Words, Old Concepts, 
13 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 167, 168 (1984) (stating that “one can only guess whether there is 
any difference between those general standards [predominant character versus substantially 
equivalent standard in earlier case law] in terms of the degree to which foreign law must 
conform to U.S. tax principles”). These 1983 proposed regulations also set forth detailed 
guidance on dual capacity taxpayers that granted partial foreign tax credit relief for dual 
capacity taxpayers if the foreign jurisdiction had a generally imposed income tax that applied 
outside the extraction industry. For an analysis of this regulatory evolution through the 
issuance of the 1983 proposed regulations, see Kevin D. Dolan, Foreign Tax Credit 
Regulations as They Affect Petroleum Income—Post Mortem and Analysis, 83 TAX MGMT. INT’L 
J. 3, 7–8 (1983). The final regulations issued on October 12, 1983 softened this dual capacity 
standard by providing partial foreign tax credit relief would be available for dual capacity 
taxpayers even if the foreign country did not have a generally applicable income tax that was 
imposed on non-extraction taxpayers. Dolan, supra note 41. 
 43. See Hearing on Foreign Tax Credit for Oil and Gas Extraction Taxes before the House 
Comm. on Ways & Means, 96th Cong. at 10–11 (1979) (stating that the proposed regulatory 
changes and proposals to tighten I.R.C. § 907 limitations were “parallel but independent 
efforts serving the same broad objective”); Dolan, supra note 41, at 3 (“Those outside of the 
petroleum industry must first understand that the [1980 and 1983 amendments to the] 
foreign tax credit regulations represent an administrative effort by the IRS and Treasury to 
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culmination of an intensive regulatory effort, the Treasury 
Department issued final section 901 regulations on October 12, 
1983 that attacked the disguised oil royalty problem in two further 
(and redundant) ways.44 First, the 1983 final regulations provide 
detailed rules in Regulation section 1.901-2A for dual capacity 
taxpayers that give the government the ability to bifurcate foreign 
levies between their tax and royalty components.45 Second, the 
promulgation of Regulation section 1.901-2A was a principled and 
targeted response that provides an effective means of addressing the 
disguised oil royalty problem on its own and made section 907’s 
overbroad prescription for the same problem a redundancy.46 
As a result of much litigation that arose after its promulgation of 
regulations under section 901 to address the disguised oil royalty 
problem, a fascinating jurisprudence developed. This new 
jurisprudence allows extraction taxes to remain creditable income 
taxes in an amount in excess of the generally applicable income tax 
under the facts and circumstances test set forth in Treasury 
Regulation §1.901-2A(c).47 The Treasury Department has indicated 
 
limit the creditability of high rate foreign extraction taxes and that, absent concerns related to 
extraction taxes, the regulation project would probably not have been undertaken.”). 
 44. T.D. 7918, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,272 (Oct. 12, 1983). 
 45. Dolan, supra note 41, at 168; Dolan, supra note 41, at 6–7. For a detailed 
discussion of the dual capacity taxpayer regulatory framework in Treas. Reg § 1.901-2A, see 
JOEL D. KUNTZ & ROBERT J. PERONI, U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION ¶ B4.03 at ¶ [2][b] 
(ThompsonReuters/WG&L 2014 with updates through March 2014); Kevin Dolan & 
Caroline Dupuy, THE CREDITABILITY OF FOREIGN TAXES II.C.2, Tax Mgmt. Port. (2014 
BNA) 901-2nd; Philip Postlewaite & Stephanie Renee Hoffer, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: 
CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL § 6.06, § 6.10 (5th ed. 2010); Marc M. Levey, Creditability of 
a Foreign Tax: The Principles, The Regulations, and the Complexity, 3 J.L. & COM. 193, 216–
24 (1983). 
 46. See David R. Tillinghast, International Tax Simplification, 8 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 187, 
227–28 (1990); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT, 
INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES INCOME TAXATION: PROPOSALS ON UNITED 
STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN PERSONS AND THE FOREIGN INCOME OF UNITED STATES 
PERSONS 338–41 (1987); Dolan & Dupuy, supra note 45, at VIII.B. (stating that “[s]ince 
both the TEFRA § 907 amendments and the specific economic benefit rules of the § 901 and 
§ 903 regulations address the issue of high rate extraction taxes, the issuance of those 
regulations on the heels of TEFRA was arguably anticlimactic.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 338 (1999) (UK petroleum tax held to 
be creditable); Texasgulf, Inc. v. Comm’r, 107 T.C. 51 (1996), aff’d, 172 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 
1999) (holding that Ontario mining tax was creditable); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Comm’r, 
104 T.C. 256 (1995) (Norway’s surtax on petroleum activities was held to be creditable under 
1980 temporary regulations); Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-1 C.B. 194 (the Indonesian petroleum 
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that Congress should modify the dual capacity standard, presumably 
to reverse taxpayer victories under the facts and circumstances test in 
Treasury Regulation §1.901-2A(c). However, the Treasury 
Department can bring about its reform proposal simply by 
affirmatively removing its own facts and circumstances test contained 
in Treasury Regulation §1.901-2A(c) and instead requiring taxpayers 
to use the safe harbor of Treasury Regulation §1.901-2A(d). If this 
regulatory amendment were made, the outcome of these changes 
would mimic the result afforded under prior temporary regulations 
and would achieve the result that the Treasury Department 
inexplicably says it is now stymied from achieving.48 Thus, the critical 
point for policy-makers and scholars is that any further reform efforts 
to address the disguised oil royalty problem can and should be 
targeted at Treasury Regulation §1.901-2A without the need for 
further redundant measures such as section 907. 
However, even though reforming Regulation section 1.901-2A 
would have been sufficient to solve the disguised oil royalty problem, 
the Treasury Department still forged ahead to adopt a separate line 
of attack on the disguised oil royalty problem. It revised the general 
foreign tax credit eligibility standards under Regulation section 
1.901-2 to mandate that all foreign levies must satisfy a mandatory, 
formalistic, three-pronged test in order to be eligible for U.S. foreign 
tax credit relief. This regulatory change was a further redundant 
attack against the dreaded disguised oil royalty problem.49  
Regulation section 1.901-2 begins in a noncontroversial manner 
by stating that a foreign tax’s “predominant character” must be that 
of an income tax in order to be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit 
 
tax was modified after Rev. Rul. 76-215 had denied its eligibility for foreign tax credit relief 
and the modified version was found to be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief). 
 48. Compare TREASURY DEPARTMENT, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROPOSALS at 26–27 (Feb. 2016), with 
Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2A(d) (sets forth standard advocated by the Treasury Department in its 
reform proposal, but this provision is an elective safe harbor; the Treasury Department can 
simply mandate this standard instead of allowing its elective application), and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 48 Fed. Reg. 14,641 (Apr. 5, 1983) (sets forth standard in proposed 
regulations that the Treasury Department now says that it likes better). 
 49. See Glenn E. Coven, International Comity and the Foreign Tax Credit: Crediting 
Nonconforming Taxes, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 83, 100–05 (1999). The formalistic, predominant 
character standard set forth in the 1983 final regulations was originally developed by the IRS 
chief counsel’s office as part of its litigation strategy against the disguised oil royalty problem. 
See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,540 (Jan. 5, 1976); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,263 
(Sept. 21, 1977); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,552 (Jan. 19, 1976). 
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relief.50 The 1983 final regulations further provide that a foreign levy 
meets this “predominant character” standard if the foreign tax is 
likely to reach net gain in the normal circumstances in which it 
applies.51 This “predominant character” phraseology and the desire 
to determine whether “net gain”52 is being taxed in the foreign 
country harkens back to prior judicial case law that took a holistic, 
substance-over-form inquiry of whether a foreign tax levy was 
eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief. However, it is at this point 
that the 1983 final regulations diverge from prior case law, stating 
that a tax will be conclusively determined to not meet the 
“predominant character” standard unless the foreign tax levy satisfies 
three specific formal design features.53 Specifically, the foreign tax 
must satisfy the realization test,54 the gross receipts test,55 and the net 
income test.56  
These three formal regulatory tests are drawn from several lower 
court decisions in the mid-1970s that arguably endorsed the idea 
that a foreign tax levy must meet certain pre-defined formalistic 
criteria in order for to be considered an income tax in the U.S. 
sense.57 Relying on the reasoning in these lower court decisions, the 
 
 50. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(1)(ii). 
 51. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(3) (as amended in 2012). 
 52. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b). 
 53. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(1) (as amended in 2012). For an excellent summary of the 
prior case law and the efforts made in the 1983 final regulations to tighten up the standards 
for allowing foreign tax credit relief, see Dolan, supra note 41. 
 54. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 2012) (“A foreign tax satisfies the 
realization requirement if, judged on the basis of its predominant character, it is imposed (A) 
[u]pon or subsequent to the occurrence of events (‘realization events’) that would result in the 
realization of income under the income tax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.”). 
 55. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(3)(i) (as amended in 2012) (“A foreign tax satisfies the 
gross receipts requirement if, judged on the basis of its predominant character, it is imposed on 
the basis of (A) [g]ross receipts.”). 
 56. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i) (as amended in 2012) (“A foreign tax satisfies the 
net income requirement if, judged on the basis of its predominant character, the base of the tax 
is computed by reducing gross receipts . . . to permit (A) [r]ecovery of the significant costs and 
expenses . . . attributable, under reasonable principles, to such gross receipts; or (B) [r]ecovery 
of such significant costs and expenses computed under a method that is likely to produce an 
amount that approximates, or is greater than, recovery of such significant costs 
and expenses.”). 
 57. See Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 677 F.2d 72, 86–87 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (“The 
[foreign tax] in its structure and express provisions thus permits the tax to be imposed on 
unrealized income, a generally impermissible result for an income tax in the United States 
sense.”); Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513, 523 (Ct. Cl. 
1972) (states that U.S. foreign tax credit relief under § 901(b)(1) is available only if a “foreign 
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1983 final regulations sought to stake out clear and prescriptive 
standards for identifying the essential design features that a foreign 
tax must have to be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief.58  
As to the net income test, a foreign net-basis tax is an income tax 
in the U.S. sense if and only if the foreign levy allows for the 
recovery of the taxpayer’s significant costs.59 Instead of allowing 
 
income tax[ is] designed to fall on some net gain or profit, and includes a gross income tax if, 
but only if, that impost is almost sure, or very likely, to reach some net gain because costs or 
expenses will not be so high as to offset the net profit”); Bank of Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. 
Comm’r, 61 T.C. 752, 762–63 (1974) (stating the following as to tests articulated by the 
Claims Court were appropriate: “Perhaps the test which we and the Court of Claims have 
articulated will not provide that magic touchstone whereby every situation in this area can be 
precisely located in the spectrum of foreign taxes ranging from pure net income taxes on one 
end to pure excise, sales, or privilege taxes on the other. But we are convinced that the test is 
not ‘manufactured out of whole cloth,’ as petitioner would have us believe, and that it provides 
a rational and manageable basis for interpretation of section 901(b)(1).”). 
 58. T.D. 7918, 1983-2 C.B. 113, 114. After endorsing the cases mentioned in supra 
note 50, as authority for mandating that each foreign tax must separately and formalistically 
satisfy pre-defined formal design features of the gross receipts test in Treas. Reg. §1.901-
2(b)(3)(i), a realization test in Treas. Reg. §1.901-2(b)(2)(i), and a net income test in Treas. 
Reg. §1.901-2(b)(4)(i), the regulations then provided that each such test must be separately met 
in order for a foreign levy payment to qualify for U.S. foreign tax credit relief. The Treasury 
Department was transparent in its desire, stating in the preamble to T.D. 7918 as follows: 
“The regulations set forth three tests for determining if a foreign tax is likely to reach net gain: 
the realization test, the gross receipts test, and the net income test. All of these tests must be 
met in order for the predominant character of the foreign tax to be that of an income tax in 
the U.S. sense.” The government has been adamant in its litigating positions that the three-
part test set forth in Regulation section 1.901-2(b) must be met in form in order for a foreign 
tax to be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief. See Brief for Respondent at 95, PPL Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 135 T.C. 304 (2010) (No. 25393-07) (“If a foreign tax fails to satisfy the ‘net gain’ 
requirement of the Regulations, it is not creditable for U.S. tax purposes. And the ‘net gain’ 
requirement requires an analysis of neither the underlying purpose of the foreign tax nor the 
components of the foreign tax (to determine, for instance, if the Profit-Making Value is a 
generally accepted method for valuing a Windfall Tax Company). Simply, the ‘net gain’ 
requirement requires that a foreign tax satisfy each of the three objective tests (realization, 
gross receipts, and net income) to be creditable. The U.K. Windfall Tax fails to satisfy each of 
the three net gain tests, and therefore it is not a creditable tax.”); Brief for Respondent, supra, 
at 98 (“The regulation provides three specific tests, all of which a foreign tax must satisfy to be 
deemed an income tax in the U.S. sense, and therefore creditable. These regulatory tests 
neither permit nor require the application of these tests to the ‘substance’ of the tax.”); Brief 
for Respondent at 38, Entergy v. Comm’r, 100 T.C.M. (CCH) 202 (2010) (No. 25132-06) 
(“Finally, analysis of pre-regulation case law does not assist in the resolution of this case, since 
petitioners do not dispute that the U.K. Windfall Tax must satisfy all three of the net gain 
requirements of the regulations to qualify as a creditable tax.”). 
 59. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i) (as amended in 2012). This net income 
requirement was derived from several lower court decisions that pre-dated the regulations. 
Bank of Am. Natl. Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 459 F.2d at 519 (Court of Claims stated that foreign 
levy must attempt to reach some net gain in the normal circumstances in which the tax 
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deductions for actual significant expenses, foreign law can allow 
reductions of the tax base as long as the substitute methodology is 
likely to produce an amount that approximates, or is greater than, a 
recovery of all significant costs and expenses.60 Furthermore, 
although foreign law can allow for a different period for cost 
recovery than is allowed under U.S. law, the net income requirement 
is not met if the deferral of cost recovery effectively represents a 
denial of such recovery.61 In addition, the net income test in the 
1983 final regulations provides that a foreign tax levy must usually 
allow losses incurred in any aspect of a trade or business in the taxing 
country to offset profits earned in other aspects of the business.62 
Taken as a whole, the 1983 final regulations posit that an income tax 
in the U.S. sense must allow for a recovery of all significant business 
expenditures (or their economic equivalent) in some 
reasonable period. 
Thus, except for gross withholding taxes imposed on investment 
income where a substantial business expense is unlikely to exist, the 
1983 final regulations purport to draw a bright line to prevent 
formulary taxes from being creditable when assessed on active 
business income. The issue of whether section 901 was intended to 
provide relief only for net income taxes or for gross income taxes has 
been the subject of scholarly debate for over sixty years, and there is 
little indication that the original Congress that adopted the U.S. 
 
applies); see also Bank of Am. Natl. Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 61 T.C. at 760 (Tax Court accepted 
that the governing test to determine whether a foreign tax qualifies as a creditable income tax 
is whether the tax was “designed to fall on some net gain or profit”). 
 60. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i)(B) (as amended in 2012). In Texasgulf, Inc. v. 
Comm’r, 107 TC 51, 72 (1996), aff’d, 172 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 1999), the court held that a 
“processing allowance” under an Ontario mining tax effectively compensated for a lack of 
deductions for interest, royalties, and other items because multiyear data for the taxpayer and 
most other companies subject to the tax showed that the allowance exceeded the disallowed 
costs in the aggregate and in most years. “Use of aggregate data is appropriate because a tax is 
or is not creditable for all taxpayers subject to it.” Exxon Corp. v. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 338 at 
*12 (1999) (PRT imposed by the United Kingdom was held to have met the net income 
requirement notwithstanding the lack of deduction for interest expense because “special 
allowances and reliefs” were given that as a factual matter exceeded the disallowed 
interest expense). 
 61. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i) (as amended in 2012). 
 62. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(ii) (as amended in 2012) (if a loss in one activity of 
the business is never allowed against income from other activities of the business, the loss must 
be carried to other periods so that it can be used as a deduction against profits from the same 
activity in other periods, and the period of carryover and carryback must not be so restricted so 
as to effectively represent a denial of cost recovery). 
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foreign tax credit gave this issue much thought.63 Although 
Congress’ early desire may be in doubt, there is no doubt that the 
Treasury Department, by promulgating its 1983 final regulations, 
wanted to overturn prior case law64 to the extent that prior case law 
allowed U.S. foreign tax credit relief for a gross formulary tax on 
business profits that did not provide a deduction for all significant 
business expenses. Consequently, whereas the pre-1983 case law had 
provided for a broad subjective inquiry into whether the intent of 
the foreign levy was to reach net income,65 commentators66 and the 
courts67 recognized early on that the 1983 regulations represented a 
change to prior law as they attempted to provide a prescriptive list of 
formal requirements that in form must be met. To ensure nobody 
missed this conclusion, after issuing the 1983 final regulations, the 
 
 63. See Stanley S. Surrey, Current Issues in the Taxation of Corporate Foreign Investment, 
56 COLUM. L. REV. 815, 819–22 (1956) (makes this point); see also H.R. REP. NO. 65-767 at 
11 (1918); 56 CONG. REC. 667–78 (1918). 
 64. For an example of a pre-1983 case that the 1983 final regulations intended to 
overrule, see Seatrain Lines Inc. v. Comm’r, 46 B.T.A. 1076 (1942), nonacq. 1942-2 C.B. 31. 
In Seatrain, Cuba had imposed a formulary tax upon realized gain. In order to resolve a 
dispute over the amount of deductible expenses, the Cuban government substituted a 3% tax 
on gross shipping income for a 6% tax on net profits. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the 
tax was creditable because the tax was imposed on gain realized under U.S. standards and 
because the intent of the lower gross tax was to simulate the earlier net income tax at that 
higher rate. For a discussion of this more lenient line of authority, see Owens, supra note 18, at 
46. For an excellent summary of the prior case law and the efforts made in the 1983 final 
regulations to tighten up the standards for allowing foreign tax credit relief,  Dolan, supra note 
41; see also Coven, supra note 49, at 100–05, 114–16. 
 65. See Bank of Am. Nat’l. Tr. & Sav. Ass’n. v. United States, 459 F.2d 513, 519 (Ct. 
Cl. 1972). 
 66. See Dolan, supra note 41, at 169 (stating that “[f]ortunately, the regulations provide 
specific tests for determining whether the general Bank of America standard is satisfied.”). Mr. 
Dolan was in the government and played an active role in drafting the 1983 regulations. 
 67. See Texasgulf, Inc. v. Comm’r, 107 T.C. 51, 73 n.3 (1996), aff’d, 172 F.3d 209 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (quoting Dolan commentary cited in note 42 with approval). In discussing the 
import of the 1983 final regulations, the Tax Court observed as follows: 
The preamble states that the regulations adopt the creditability criterion from 
certain cases to use in deciding whether the predominant character of a foreign tax is 
likely to reach net gain for purposes of section 1.901-2(a)(3)(i), Income Tax Regs. 
The preamble states that a tax is likely to reach net gain if it meets three tests 
provided in the regulations. The regulations provide objective and quantitative 
standards that were not used in cases which decided creditability of foreign taxes before 
the regulations became final. Regulations can supersede prior case law to the extent 
that they provide requirements and definitions not found in prior case law. See 
Bowater Inc. v. Comm’r, 101 T.C. 207, 212 (1993); Nissho Iwai Am. Corp. v. 
Comm’r, 89 T.C. 765, 776-77 (1987); Texasgulf, Inc., 107 T.C. at 73 n.3 
(emphasis and scoring added). 
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IRS revoked fifty years of prior section 901 revenue ruling positions68 
and reversed long-standing IRS acquiescences in prior section 901 
cases69 whenever those prior rulings were inconsistent with the 
government’s new predominant character standard for 
credit eligibility.70 
The formality imposed by the 1983 final regulations had a 
specific goal, namely to represent a redundant attack on the 
objectionable disguised oil royalty problem that at the time was 
taking all the oxygen out of the room.71 In this regard, the 
objectionable extraction taxes often were levied based at least in part 
on a formulary basis.72 Because of this, tightening the section 901 
eligibility standards with a new predominant character standard that 
required cost recovery for all of the significant costs (or allow for a 
substitute deduction equal to or greater than such costs) provided 
another cogent basis to disallow credit relief for disguised 
oil royalties.73 
 
 68. Initially, the IRS did not challenge the foreign tax credit generator aspects of foreign 
taxes paid under production sharing agreements that generated inflated amounts of U.S. 
foreign tax credits. See Rev. Rul. 69-388, 1969-2 C.B. 154 (Indonesia imposed a special tax by 
contract for companies operating in oil and gas producing regions in Indonesia held to be a 
creditable “in lieu of” tax under I.R.C. § 903; this ruling was colloquially known and 
“Indonesia I” in the industry). The IRS subsequently revoked Indonesia I. See Rev. Rul. 76-
215, 1976-1 C.B. 194 (stating that the payment was in substance a royalty, not a tax, and 
therefore not eligible for U.S. tax credit relief under either I.R.C. § 901 or I.R.C. § 903; this 
ruling was colloquially known as “Indonesia II” in the industry). But, by the mid-1970s, the 
IRS decided to launch its own assault on these “disguised oil royalty arrangements” even as 
Congress added a new foreign tax credit basket to address this same phenomenon. See Coven, 
supra note 49, at 100–05 (analyzing reversal of the historic IRS position as set forth in its 
prior rulings). 
 69. See Rev. Rul. 84-172, 1984-2 C.B. 315 (declaring each of the following rulings 
obsolete after adoption of final regulations: Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-1 C.B. 194; Rev. Rul. 78-
61, 1978-1 C.B. 221; Rev. Rul. 78-62, 1978-1 C.B. 226; Rev. Rul. 78-63, 1978-1 C.B. 228); 
see also Coven, supra note 49, at 101–03. 
 70. See Coven, supra note 49, at 101–03. 
 71. Kevin D. Dolan, Foreign Tax Credit Regulations as They Affect Petroleum Income—
Post Mortem and Analysis, 83 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 3–4 (1983). 
 72. See e.g., Rev. Rul. 69-388, 1969-2 C.B. 154, revoked by Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-1 
C.B. 194; Rev. Rul. 55-296, 1955-1 C.B. 386 (Saudi Arabia’s imposed surtax equal to a 
percentage of the posted price per barrel of oil was held to be a creditable income tax); Rev. 
Rul. 68-552, 1968-2 C.B. 306 (a surtax imposed by Libya based on a posted price per barrel 
on holders of petroleum concessions was held to be a creditable income tax). Rev. Rul. 55-296 
and Rev. Rul. 68-552 were both revoked by Rev. Rul. 78-63, 1978-1 C.B. 228. For a 
discussion of this parallel effort, see Coven, supra note 49, at 114–16. 
 73. See Coven, supra note 49, at 114–16. 
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Thus, as of the end of 1983, three redundant policy responses 
had been leveled against the singular disguised oil royalty problem. 
First, section 907 set forth a specialized limitation for extraction 
taxes to prevent the cross-crediting of extraction taxes. Second, new 
dual capacity taxpayer regulations under Regulation section 1.901-
2A denied foreign tax credit relief for the royalty portion of any 
foreign tax levy. Third, the foreign tax credit eligibility standards set 
forth in Regulation section 1.901-2(b) were tightened for all 
taxpayers to make it much more difficult for formulary taxes to be 
creditable. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in PPL Corp. v. 
Commissioner,74 the revolutionary nature of these changes could not 
be underestimated. As Professor Coven forcefully pointed out fifteen 
years ago, the appropriate U.S. response to the disguised oil royalty 
problem was to treat the portion of any purported foreign tax 
payment as a non-tax payment to the extent such payment was made 
in return for a specific economic benefit.75 But unfortunately, the 
government’s response was much more expansive than necessary.  
The Treasury Department’s detailed dual-capacity regulation set 
forth in Regulation section 1.901-2A provides an adequate means to 
solve the dual-capacity problem by bifurcating payments made by a 
dual-capacity taxpayer into a tax component and a non-tax 
component.76 After this bifurcation, Regulation section 1.901-2A 
provides that only the portion of the bifurcated payment that is 
considered a tax payment is eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit 
relief—assuming all other section 901 requirements are satisfied.77 
Thus, it was not necessary for the Treasury Department to adopt the 
formalistic three-pronged predominant character standard in 
Regulation section 1.901-2(b). The regulation redundantly tried to 
solve the same disguised oil royalty problem that Regulation section 
1.901-2A is better designed to solve. In addition, Regulation section 
1.901-2A, once adopted, made section 907 redundant as well.78 In 
other words, the Treasury Department responded to one observable 
problem (the disguised oil royalty problem) with complex and 
 
 74. See PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 S. Ct. 1897 (2013). 
 75. See Coven, supra note 49, at 103–04. 
 76. See Treas. Reg. §1.901-2A (1983); see also authorities cited in note 42. 
 77. Treas. Reg. §1.901-2A(a)(1). 
 78. See authorities cited in note 41. 
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redundant changes to the foreign tax credit regime when only one 
principled response was needed.  
Furthermore, unlike Regulation section 1.901-2A’s targeted and 
coherent approach to the objectionable disguised oil royalty 
problem, Congress’ overbroad enactment of section 907 and the 
Treasury Department’s overbroad effort to rewrite the foreign tax 
credit eligibility standards lead to incoherent outcomes. These 
redundant attacks restrict or deny foreign tax credit relief for foreign 
income taxes that are paid in nonobjectionable ways and are not 
disguised oil royalties. 
2. PPL’s damage to the formalistic predominant character standard 
This prior analysis represents the factual background that should 
be considered when one approaches the Supreme Court’s decision in 
PPL Corp. v. Commissioner.79 The U.K. windfall profits tax in the 
PPL litigation provided for a one-time twenty-three percent 
formulary assessment tax on all privatized utility companies. This tax 
applied to the difference between a company’s “profit-making 
value”80 and the price for which the company was privatized.81 
Under the case law that pre-dated the 1983 regulatory changes, 
the above-described U.K. windfall profits tax would have been 
eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief. Earlier iterations of U.K. 
excess profits tax regimes considered in the pre-1983 period had 
been found to be creditable,82 and IRS administrative practice stated 
that a wide range of analogous excess profits regimes met the 
 
 79. See PPL Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1897. 
 80. For this purpose, “profit-making value was defined as its average annual profit per 
day over an initial period that was generally a four-year period and then this amount was 
multiplied by nine. The number nine was chosen as a baseline ‘price-to-earnings ratio.’ 
Although described as a tax on excess value, the tax had the economic effects of a tax on excess 
profits because the calculation of ‘value in profits terms’ was based on average net income over 
the four-year period, rather than on an actual measure of value (which could have easily been 
established from market data) and so from an economic point of view the U.K. windfall profits 
tax was a tax on excess profits. See Brief for Amici Curiae Rosanne Altshuler, Richard M. Bird, 
Malcom Gillis, Arnold C. Harberger, Gary C. Hufbauer, Charles E. McLure, Jr., Jack Mintz, 
& George R. Zodrow at 8–9, PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 S. Ct. 1897 (2013) (No. 12-43). 
 81. See Entergy v. Comm’r, 683 F.3d 233, 234 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 82. See Robertson v. Comm’r, 176 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1949); Ethyl Corp. v. United 
States, 75 F. Supp. 461 (Ct. Cl. 1948); Colombian Carbon Co. v. Comm’r, 25 B.T.A. 456 
(1932), acq., 1932-1 C.B. 2. 
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eligibility standards set forth in the pre-1983 case law.83 The IRS had 
even ruled that a tax levy imposed on average profits spanning 
multiple years, much like the U.K. windfall profits tax that was the 
subject of the PPL litigation, was entitled to U.S. foreign tax 
credit relief.84  
But these cases and administrative pronouncements preceded the 
1983 regulatory amendments to Regulation section 1.901-2(b), 
and, as the Tax Court recognized in its Texasgulf decision, 
“[r]egulations [under Regulation section 1.901-2] can supersede 
prior case law to the extent that they provide requirements and 
definitions not found in prior case law.”85 Thus, the PPL case is 
interesting precisely because the taxpayer substantively satisfied the 
standards for U.S. foreign tax credit relief under the historic pre-
1983 case law criteria (a conclusion the IRS National Office appears 
to have accepted before the litigation or at least did not refute).86 
Even so, the U.K. windfall profits tax failed to comply with the 
three-pronged predominant character standard that was put into 
place in response to the disguised oil royalty problem.  
To add further intrigue, the IRS asserted the formalistic aspects 
of the predominant character standard set forth in Regulation 
section 1.901-2(b) against PPL even though the government did not 
 
 83. See Rev. Rul. 68-318, 1968-1 C.B. 342 (Italian tax on profits in excess of six percent 
of capital); Rev. Rul. 56-51, 1956-1 C.B. 320 (Cuban tax on profits in excess of 1/10th of 
estimated real worth of capital). Another ruling concluded that a tax imposed at variable rates 
was creditable. Rev. Rul. 74-435, 1974-2 C.B. 204 (Swiss Cantonal tax imposed at variable 
rates on multi-year profits was creditable). 
 84. See Columbian Carbon Co. v. Comm’r, 25 B.T.A. 456, 463 (1932), acq., 1932-1 
C.B. 2 (Service contested timing of accrual, but not creditability of U.K. tax based on average 
profits of three-year period preceding assessment year); see also Rev. Rul. 69-446, 1969-2 C.B. 
150 (Swiss National Defense Tax, which is imposed on average profits for the two years 
preceding the assessment year, is an income tax). 
 85. Texasgulf, Inc., 107 T.C. at 69. See quote from Texasgulf, Inc in note 60. Also, the 
government was categorical to the Tax Court, stating that the pre-1983 case law was of “little 
consequence” and that the 1983 final regulations superseded prior case law. See Reply Brief of 
Respondent, at 93–99, PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 304 (2010) (No. 25393-07). 
 86. It is interesting to note at this point that the IRS National Office appeared to have 
agreed that the pre-1983 case law was supportive of the taxpayer’s position even before the 
PPL litigation, but after analyzing that favorable case law the IRS National Office then argued 
that the government had authority to change the standards for creditability in its final 1983 
Treasury regulations and then stated as follows: “analysis of pre-regulation case law does not 
assist in the resolution of this case, since Taxpayer does not dispute that the U.K. Windfall Tax 
must satisfy the net gain test of the regulations to qualify as a creditable tax.” PLR 200719011 
(May 11, 2007). 
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contend that PPL was a dual-capacity taxpayer or that the U.K. 
windfall profits tax was a disguised royalty.87 Rather, the government 
used the overbroad formality of Regulation section 1.901-2(b) to 
make an incoherent attack on the foreign tax credit eligibility of 
foreign taxes paid by PPL in a nonobjectionable transaction. PPL, 
therefore, was at risk of being counted as collateral damage in the 
government’s foreign tax credit war. 
The Tax Court held that PPL was entitled to foreign tax credit 
relief, finding as a factual matter that the U.K. windfall profits tax 
was designed to reach net income and did in fact tax net income in 
all cases.88 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s 
decision.89 In its appeal to the Third Circuit, the government 
asserted,90 and the Third Circuit accepted,91 that the U.K. windfall 
profits tax used a tax base greater than gross receipts and therefore 
failed the gross receipts test contained in the 1983 final regulations.92 
As an additional ground for reversal, the government asserted,93 and 
 
 87. See PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 S. Ct. 571 (2013). 
 88. The Tax Court stated as follows: 
Parliament did, in fact, enact a tax that operated as an excess profits tax for the vast 
majority of the windfall tax companies. The design of the windfall tax formula made 
certain that the tax would, in fact, operate as an excess profits tax for the vast 
majority of the companies subject to it. 
Because both the design and effect of the windfall tax was to tax an amount that, 
under U.S. tax principles, may be considered excess profits realized by the vast 
majority of the windfall tax companies, we find that it did, in fact, “reach net gain in 
the normal circumstances in which it [applied]”, and, therefore, that its 
“predominant character” was “that of an income tax in the U.S. sense.”  
PPL Corp., 135 T.C. at 340–41. 
 89. See PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 665 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 90. See Opening Brief for the Appellant at 23–29, 30–33, PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 665 
F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1069). The government repeated this argument in its briefs 
before the Supreme Court. See Brief of the Respondent at 33–43, PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 133 
S. Ct. 1897 (No. 12-43). 
 91. PPL Corp., 665 F.3d at 67–68 (observing that the Third Circuit so held). 
 92. Id. at 65 (“In our view, PPL’s formulation of the substance of the U.K. Windfall 
Profits Tax is a bridge too far. No matter how many of PPL’s proposed simplifications we may 
accept, we return to a fundamental problem: the tax base cannot be initial period profit alone 
unless we rewrite the tax rate. Under the Treasury Department’s regulation, we cannot do 
that.”); Opening Brief for the Appellant at 31–32, PPL Corp., 665 F.3d 60 (No. 11-11069) 
(The windfall profits tax was then “imposed on the difference between profit-making value and 
flotation value, and a tax on the value of property does not have the predominant character of 
an income tax in the U.S. sense. Thus, the tax base for the windfall profits tax was completely 
divorced from any traditional concept of gross receipts.”). 
 93. The government asserted the following in its Opening Brief at 24–25, PPL Corp., 
665 F.3d 60 (No. 11-1069): 
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the Third Circuit accepted,94 that the U.K. windfall profits tax also 
failed to satisfy the realization test set forth in the 1983 final 
regulations.95 Because these formalistic criteria were not satisfied, the 
Third Circuit found that the U.K. windfall profits tax failed two out 
of the three mandatory tests contained in the 1983 final regulations’ 
predominant character standard and therefore was ineligible for U.S. 
foreign tax credit relief.96 
The Third Circuit denied foreign tax credit relief to the taxpayer 
in PPL, but it nowhere contested the Tax Court’s factual 
determination97 that the U.K. windfall profits tax actually achieved its 
intended operational purpose of taxing only net income.98 Thus, in 
one sense, the PPL case represents an odd case for disallowing 
foreign tax credit relief because the Tax Court made a finding of fact 
that the U.K. windfall profits tax operated as a tax levied on net 
income99 and resulted in a levy of some amount less than total net 
profits in all cases.100 Yet, the Third Circuit held that the U.K. 
 
[I]t is well-established that under U.S. tax law, a tax on value or appreciation is not a 
tax on realized income (and thus does not have the predominant character of an 
income tax in the U.S. sense. See Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 559 
(1991); Tatum v. Comm’r, 400 F.2d 242, 247 (5th Cir. 1968) (“Thus far Congress 
has not seen fit to tax unrealized appreciation in property value.”). 
Nor was the windfall tax a tax upon previously realized income. The fact that a 
company’s profit making value was determined by reference to past profits does not 
convert the windfall tax into a tax on those past profits. Indeed, a tax on income-
producing property does not become an income tax simply because the property’s 
value is calculated for tax purposes by reference to the amount of income the 
property generates. 
The government repeated these arguments before the Supreme Court. See Brief of the 
Respondent at 35–36, PPL Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1897 (No. 12-43). 
 94. See PPL Corp., 665 F.3d at 67 n.3 (observing that Third Circuit so held). 
 95. Id. 
 96. See PPL Corp., 665 F.3d at 67 n.3. 
 97. The Tax Court made specific findings of fact indicating that they found that the 
legislative intent for the U.K. windfall profits tax was to assess a tax on excess profits and the 
Third Circuit nowhere contests these findings. PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 304, 339–40 
(2010), rev’d, 665 F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 98. PPL Corp. v. Commissioner, 133 S. Ct. 1897, 1903 (2013) (noting that the Third 
Circuit explicitly discussed its concerns regarding the gross receipts and 
realization  requirements). 
 99. The Third Circuit is silent on this point, but the Fifth Circuit makes the statement 
categorically as follows: “the tax only reached — and only could reach — utilities that realized a 
profit in the relevant period, calculating profit in the ordinary sense (e.g. by subtracting 
operating expenses associated with generating the utilities’ income). This satisfies the net 
income requirement.” See Entergy v. Comm’r, 683 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 100. PPL Corp.,135 T.C. at 338, 341. 
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windfall profits tax was non-creditable for U.S. foreign tax credit 
purposes because the formal design of the U.K. windfall profits tax, 
which included formulary tax aspects, failed to comply with the strict 
requirements of the 1983 final regulations.101  
The Fifth Circuit in Entergy v. Commissioner102 held that this 
same U.K. windfall profits tax was entitled to U.S. foreign tax credit 
relief,103 thus creating a split in the circuits. In its evaluation of the 
Third Circuit’s plain textual reading of the 1983 final regulations, 
the Fifth Circuit in Entergy104 stated that the Third Circuit’s denial of 
foreign tax credit relief exalted “form-over-substance.”105 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in PPL Corp. v. Commissioner to 
resolve the circuit split.106 
The facts set forth in the PPL case put squarely at issue whether 
the formalistic predominant character standard would deny foreign 
tax credit relief to a non-dual-capacity taxpayer who paid a formulary 
tax that would have been entitled to relief under pre-1983 case law. 
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the U.K. windfall profits 
tax was entitled to U.S. foreign tax credit relief, thus reversing the 
Third Circuit’s decision and affirming the Tax Court’s original 
decision. But, in the course of its opinion, the Court omitted any 
detailed discussion of the mandatory formalistic predominant 
character test set forth in the 1983 final regulations. Instead of 
discussing how the 1983 final regulations had attempted to impose a 
 
 101. See PPL Corp., 665 F.3d at 67 n.3. 
 102. Entergy, 683 F.3d at 233. 
 103. Id. at 239. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 237. The Fifth Circuit explained its disagreement with the Third Circuit’s 
analysis as follows: “In fact, as the record indicates, each utility could only be subject to the 
Windfall Tax after making a profit exceeding approximately an 11% annual return on its initial 
flotation value, and the Windfall Tax liability increased linearly with additional profits past that 
point. Moreover, the Third Circuit opinion seems to overlook that a tax based on actual 
financial profits in the U.K. sense necessarily begins with gross receipts, as, again, the record 
here indicates. London Electricity’s profit for purpose of the Windfall Tax was calculated by 
computing gross receipts less operating expenses. The Windfall Tax was designed to reach a 
subset of this leftover amount by beginning with an amount predicated on actual gross receipts 
minus flotation value.” Id. at 233 (internal italics omitted). In affirming the Tax Court’s 
allowance of foreign tax credit relief to the taxpayer in Entergy v. Commissioner, the Fifth 
Circuit reformulated the U.K. windfall profits tax into an economically equivalent formulation 
that (as reformulated) did meet the three formal design features of the 1983 final regulations. 
See id. at 238–39. 
 106. See PPL Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1897. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1924 
formalistic approach, the Court attempted to harmonize the 
predominant character standard contained in the 1983 final 
regulations with the pre-1983 case law, stating that Regulation 
section 1.901-2(b) “codifies longstanding doctrine dating back to 
Biddle.”107 The Court omitted any serious discussion of the 
government’s assertion that its formalistic predominant character 
standard was intended to bring “structure and clarity” not found in 
the earlier case law.108  
As to the argument that the 1983 final regulations established a 
set of requirements that must be met in form,109 the Court stated 
that this notion could not be squared with the black-letter principle 
that “tax laws deal in economic realities, not legal abstractions.”110 
The Supreme Court eschewed any effort to apply the formal 
requirements of the predominant character standard set forth in the 
1983 final regulations and instead used a holistic analysis reminiscent 
of the pre-1983 case law. In doing so, the Court opined that 
substance over form principles compel a conclusion “that the 
 
 107. See id. at 1901. 
 108. Compare id. at 1905 (where Court discusses portions of the government brief 
dealing with pre-1983 case law), with Brief for Respondent at 33–43, PPL v. Comm’r, 133 S. 
Ct. 1897 (2013) (No. 12-43) (where the government asserts that the formalistic three-
pronged test set forth in the 1983 Treasury regulations is entitled to deference under Mayo 
Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011)). The 
government’s argument was more robust in its brief before the Third Circuit and the Fifth 
Circuit as the following excerpt from its briefs in those proceedings so indicates: “[T]he Tax 
Court was required to accord the regulation Chevron deference. See Mayo Found., 131 S. Ct. 
704. Moreover, “because § 901’s exemption from taxation is ‘a privilege extended by 
legislative grace’” the regulation had to be “strictly construed.” Texasgulf, Inc. v. Comm’r, 
172 F.3d 209, 214 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 677 F.2d 72, 79 
(Ct. Cl. 1982)). Instead, the Tax Court paid only lip service to the regulation. Although it 
discussed the regulation in summarizing the relevant legal principles (JA27-29), the court went 
on to apply its own test for determining the predominant character of the windfall tax. Thus, 
the court considered at length the historical background and purpose of the windfall tax and 
its effect on the companies subject to the tax. It made no effort whatsoever to explain whether 
the windfall tax met any of the three regulatory subtests, all of which had to be met for the tax 
to be creditable.” Compare Brief for Appellant at 24, Entergy v. Comm’r, 683 F.3d 233 (5th 
Cir. 2012) (No. 10-60988) with Brief for Appellant at 21–22, PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 665 
F.3d 60 (3d Cir. 2011) (No. 11-1069). 
 109. See PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, 135 T.C. 304, 330 (2010) (“Respondent argues that the 
1983 regulations alone control the creditability of the windfall tax because those regulations 
subsume or supersede prior caselaw and ‘neither require nor permit inquiry into the purpose 
underlying the enactment of a foreign tax or the history of a foreign taxing statute.’”). 
 110. PPL Corp., 133 S. Ct. at 1905. 
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windfall [profits] tax is [best viewed as] nothing more than a tax on 
actual profits above a threshold.”111  
Admittedly, the formalistic predominant character test set forth 
in the 1983 final regulations would have created an incoherent result 
if applied to deny foreign tax credit relief to PPL as PPL was not the 
intended target of these technical rules. Nevertheless, by not 
resolving the PPL case within the formal guidelines of the 
predominant character test and failing to discuss the fact that the 
1983 final regulations attempted to impose a formalistic set of 
requirements in lieu of the more holistic approach used in the pre-
1983 case law, the Supreme Court cast considerable doubt on the 
continued validity of the 1983 final regulation’s mandatory 
formalistic predominant character standard. Said differently, the 
Supreme Court’s revisionist history undermines the formalistic 
predominant character standard set forth in the 1983 Treasury 
regulation.  It places a heavy judicial gloss over those regulations to 
harmonize them with “longstanding doctrine dating back to 
Biddle”112 when in fact the 1983 final regulations attempted to 
impose formality to the foreign tax credit eligibility analysis in order 
to provide “structure and clarity” not found in the prior case law.113 
3. Indopco’s damage to the formalistic predominant 
 character standard 
The Supreme Court’s decision in PPL did serious damage to the 
plain meaning of the 1983 final regulations. The decision ignored 
the intended plain meaning of the 1983 final regulations and instead 
harmonized those 1983 final regulations with pre-1983 case law. 
The PPL decision, by itself, provides a sufficient reason for the 
Treasury Department to rewrite its existing section 901 regulations 
to provide a coherent standard for determining foreign tax credit 
eligibility using standards that are consistent with the Supreme 
Court’s holistic approach that harkens back to the pre-1983 case law. 
However, as discussed in this Section and the next, there are two 
other compelling reasons for the Treasury Department to open a 
 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at 1901, 1905 (stating that the regulations codify longstanding doctrine 
dating back to Biddle and then use “substance over form” principles to resolve the case). 
 113. See supra note 96. 
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regulatory project to rewrite the foreign tax credit eligibility 
standards contained in Regulation section 1.901-2(b).  
First, the regulatory predominant character standard fails to 
reflect the evolution in the U.S. income tax laws that has occurred 
since 1983 and consequently utilizes standards that no longer 
accurately identify an income tax in the U.S. sense. Second, the 
Internal Revenue Service, through its published guidance, has 
repeatedly ignored its own 1983 regulations in determining the 
eligibility of recent formulary-type tax regimes of other countries. 
Thus, because the Supreme Court refuses to apply the intended plain 
meaning of the 1983 regulations and because those regulations fail 
to properly describe the evolution of the U.S. income tax law that 
has occurred since their promulgation and because the IRS ignores 
the regulations it is charged with implementing (creating a de facto 
administrative law at variance with published regulations), the 
United States’ foreign tax credit regime is incoherent and 
needs reformulation. 
As a beginning point of the analysis in this Section, the 
conclusion from Section II.A.1 must be kept in mind, namely that 
the 1983 final regulations posit that an income tax in the U.S. sense 
must allow for a recovery of all significant business expenditures (or 
their economic equivalent) in some reasonable period.114 However, 
contrary to the 1983 final regulation’s requirement that all 
significant business expenditures (or an equivalent amount) must be 
recoverable as an essential feature of an income tax in the U.S. sense, 
the IRS argued in 1992 in Indopco v. Commissioner115 for the exact 
opposite position in a domestic tax context. In fact, the government 
in Indopco contended that allowing recovery for expenses was simply 
a matter of legislative grace and not an essential design feature of an 
income tax in the U.S. sense.116 Nowhere in the government’s 
Indopco briefs did it mention that it had a final section 901 
regulation (entitled to Chevron deference) that estopped the 
government from arguing that the deductibility of all valid business 
expenditures was necessary to correctly reflect taxpayer income and 
an essential feature of the U.S. income tax laws. No, the government 
 
 114. See text accompanying notes 44–55. 
 115. Indopco v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
 116. Brief for Respondent at 30–31, Indopco v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1991) 
(No. 90-1278). 
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in Indopco urged the Supreme Court to disallow cost recovery for 
expenses if those expenses provided a future benefit even when no 
separate and distinct asset was created that could allow for future 
cost recovery.117 In contrast, the taxpayer in Indopco urged the 
Supreme Court not to require capitalization unless a separate and 
distinct asset was created because capitalization without cost 
recovery failed to clearly reflect the taxpayer’s income.118 
 
 117. It is important to note how many times the government states that there are 
“many” instances where significant expenses are not allowed for recovery under the U.S. 
income tax laws as of 1992: “If an expenditure produces a permanent or long-term benefit to 
the taxpayer that will help generate income in future years, it hardly would reflect the 
taxpayer’s income to allow a current deduction for the expenditure merely because the benefit 
or advantage cannot readily be described as creating or enhancing an ‘asset.’ Indeed, the 
situation presented in this case provides a perfect example of the inadequacy of petitioner’s 
‘separate and distinct asset’ test. Petitioner does not challenge the findings of the Tax Court 
(Pet. App. 30a) and the court of appeals (Pet. App. 12a) that the takeover transaction resulted 
in permanent benefits for petitioner. Application of the test urged by petitioner-under which 
outlays may be deducted in one year even though the benefits of the expense are reaped for 
many years in the future-would result in a distortion of petitioner’s income. For this reason 
alone, petitioner’s test should be rejected. The courts have recognized many types of capital 
expenses that do not create or enhance any specific asset. Most relevant are the “changed 
corporate structure” cases discussed in Section II.A.1. In these cases, as then-Judge Blackmun 
noted in General Bancshares, 326 F.2d at 716, even when the reorganization expenses ‘have 
not resulted in the acquisition or increase of a corporate asset, [they are treated as capital 
charges and] are not, because of that fact, deductible as ordinary and necessary business 
expenses.’ Similarly, in Holeproof Hosiery Co. v. Commissioner, 11 B.T.A. 547 (1928), which 
was cited in General Bancshares, the court observed that ‘it can be argued, and not without 
merit, that no capital asset is acquired when attorneys’ fees are paid in connection with an 
increase in capitalization, but it does not follow that the payments are ordinary and necessary 
expenses of the year when made.’ 11 B.T.A. at 556. The mere fact that a corporation’s 
structure is not a ‘separate and distinct asset’ does not mean that expenses incurred to alter its 
structure for the permanent betterment of the corporation are not capital in nature. There are 
many other examples of business expenditures that have long been recognized as capital in 
nature even though they do not create or enhance any specific asset. The cost of an educational 
program that qualifies the taxpayer to enter a new trade or business is a non-deductible capital 
expenditure.” See Brief for Respondent at 30–31, Indopco v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992) 
(No. 90-1278) (emphasis added). 
 118. Consistent with the government’s argument in PPL Corp. v. Comm’r, the taxpayer 
in Indopco argued that the Supreme Court must ensure that significant business expenditures 
must be recoverable over some period as indicated in the following statement from the 
taxpayer’s brief: 
Moreover, by requiring the identification of a specific asset to which capitalized 
costs are to be assigned, the Lincoln Savings test serves the clear reflection of 
income principle that underlies the statutory scheme-it permits such costs to be 
depreciated or amortized over the useful life of the asset and to be recovered upon 
its sale or other disposition. In contrast, the court of appeals’ future benefit 
approach does not give taxpayers any means of recovering their capitalized costs. 
Where there is a future benefit but no asset to which capitalized costs can be 
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In a strongly worded and staunchly pro-government opinion, the 
Supreme Court stated that an income tax in the U.S. sense means 
gross income and that the allowance of deductions is purely a matter 
of legislative grace. The following extended excerpt from the Indopco 
case is relevant for understanding the nature of the U.S. income tax 
system as now understood and interpreted by the Supreme Court: 
In exploring the relationship between deductions and capital 
expenditures, this Court has noted the “familiar rule” that “an 
income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that the 
burden of clearly showing the right to the claimed deduction is on 
the taxpayer.” The notion that deductions are exceptions to the 
norm of capitalization finds support in various aspects of the Code. 
Deductions are specifically enumerated and thus are subject to 
disallowance in favor of capitalization. Nondeductible capital 
expenditures, by contrast, are not exhaustively enumerated in the 
Code; rather than providing a “complete list of nondeductible 
expenditures,” serves as a general means of distinguishing capital 
expenditures from current expenses. For these reasons, deductions 
are strictly construed and allowed only “as there is a clear 
provision therefor.”119 
Even if one views the Supreme Court’s statement that 
deductions are given simply as a matter of legislative grace as 
hyperbole, no one could avoid seeing that the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Indopco went out of its way to harken back to case law 
dating back to its 1934 holding that Congress has the unquestioned 
“power to condition, limit, or deny deductions from gross income in 
order to arrive at the net that it chooses to tax.”120  
Indopco also makes clear that the Court would not entertain 
criticism of Congress’s refusal to allow cost recovery for a significant 
business expenditure. Consequently, post-Indopco, the net income 
test set forth in the 1983 final regulations is at variance with what 
the government argued was the essential design feature of an income 
 
assigned, the taxpayer will not be allowed any depreciation or amortization 
deductions or any deductible loss prior to the sale or abandonment of its entire 
business. Thus, the future benefit approach, by thwarting any recovery of capitalized 
costs during the period in which the taxpayer is operating its business and earning 
the income generated by those costs, defeats a clear reflection of income. 
Brief for Petitioner at 13, Indopco v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992) (No. 90-1278). 
 119. Indopco, 503 U.S. at 84 n.4 (citations omitted; footnote omitted). 
 120. Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934). 
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tax in the U.S. sense. In 1992, the government told the Court in 
Indopco that there are “many . . . examples”121 under U.S. tax law of 
business-related expenditures that do not create deductible expenses 
and never provide cost recovery.122 Yet when judging a foreign 
country’s tax levy, the predominant character standard in the 1983 
final regulations mandates that all significant expenses must be 
entitled to cost recovery in order for foreign levy to be considered an 
income tax “in the U.S. sense.”123 The insistence by Regulation 
section 1.901-2(b) that all significant costs must be recoverable in 
the foreign country’s tax regime is diametrically opposed to what the 
government asserted in Indopco about our own income tax regime.  
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Indopco also endorsed the 
government’s view that allowing deductions was a matter of 
legislative grace and not a requirement for a tax levy to be 
considered an income tax in the U.S. sense. Thus, the requirement 
in the 1983 final regulations that cost recovery must be given for all 
significant expenses may have represented a reasonable interpretation 
of the U.S. case law in 1983, but that interpretation is no longer 
reasonable in 2016 because of the Supreme Court’s intervening 
1992 decision in Indopco. The net income test in the 1983 final 
regulations has been eroded, and the government was the one that 
argued for its erosion. In short, the government persuaded the 
Supreme Court to hold that significant expenses need not be allowed 
cost recovery in order to clearly reflect income under the U.S. 
income tax laws in Indopco. As a result, it is fundamentally 
inconsistent for the government to now argue that cost recovery for 
all significant expenses is a necessary feature for foreign levies to 
represent an income tax in the U.S. sense. 
To compound the judicial erosion of the net income 
requirement, Congress has enacted significant disallowance rules, 
further demonstrating the inaccuracies of the 1983 final regulations’ 
assertion that all significant expenses must be allowed cost 
 
 121. See supra note 102 (emphasis added). 
 122. See Brief for Respondent at 30–31, Indopco v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992) (No. 
90-1278). 
 123. This is the standard in the existing Treasury regulations that require the 
predominant character of a foreign levy must be an income tax in the US sense.  See Treas. 
Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(ii) (as amended 2013). 
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recovery.124 In this regard, Congress has outright denied deductions 
related to illegal activities,125 bribes, and kickbacks,126 implemented 
extensive restrictions on the ability to utilize passive losses,127 
expanded the scope of the at-risk rules to limit deductions,128 
partially disallowed entertainment expenses,129 disallowed certain 
salary expenses,130 and has outright disallowed certain cross-border 
interest expense deductions.131 Some of these reforms occurred 
before the 1983 final regulations were issued while others occurred 
after the issuance of the 1983 final regulations. Taken as a whole, 
these reforms demonstrate that U.S. tax law has not required that all 
significant expenses must be afforded cost recovery; rather, Congress 
has chosen to significantly limit or disallow a tax deduction for a 
whole range of business expenses in order to ensure that it can tax 
the net income in which it wants to tax.132  
With respect to all of these disallowance and limitation regimes, 
the courts have allowed Congress discretion to define the net income 
that Congress chooses to tax, regardless of whether or not all 
significant ordinary and necessary expenses are allowed as a 
deduction. Consequently, disallowing foreign tax credit relief when a 
foreign country incorporates formulary or presumptive tax principles 
is unsupportable given the intervening Supreme Court opinion in 
Indopco and given Congress’ continuing actions to disallow cost 
recovery when it wants to restrict tax benefits for some larger policy 
reason. Once the Supreme Court in Indopco gave a full-throated 
endorsement to Congress’s “power to condition, limit, or deny 
 
 124. For an analysis of the intended plain meaning of the 1983 final regulations, see the 
discussion set forth in Section II.A.1. 
 125. I.R.C. § 280E (1982); see Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. 
No. 97-248, § 351(a), 96 Stat. 324, 640 (1982). 
 126. I.R.C. § 162(c); Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902(b), 83 Stat. 
487, 710–11. 
 127. I.R.C. § 469; Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501(a), 100 Stat. 
2085, 2233 (1986). 
 128. I.R.C. § 465; Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 204(a), 90 Stat. 
1520, 1531–33 (1976). 
 129. I.R.C. § 274(n); Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 142(b). 
 130. I.R.C. § 162(m); Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 
13211(a), 107 Stat. 312, 469–71 (1993). 
 131. I.R.C. § 163(j); Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, § 
7210(b)(2), 103 Stat. 2106, 2147 (1989). 
 132. See Section II.A.1. 
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deductions from gross income in order to arrive at the net that it 
chooses to tax,”133 the 1983 final regulations became obsolete to the 
extent that they require foreign tax levies to allow all significant 
deductions in order to be considered an income tax in the 
U.S. sense. 
4. BEPS challenge to the foreign tax credit regime 
The incoherence of the formalistic predominant character 
standard set forth in Regulation section 1.901-2(b) becomes clearer 
when considering how this standard interacts with the international 
tax policy decisions of other nations. In this regard, it is important to 
keep in mind that today’s challenge for developed nations is to 
defend their tax base against profit shifting and base erosion 
strategies of multinational enterprises.134 The G20135 and the G-8136 
have each expressed concern over how countries should prevent the 
artificial shifting of profits to low tax jurisdictions. The OECD has 
engaged in a multi-year study137 designed to provide 
recommendations on how countries should address this profit-
shifting phenomenon (the so-called “base erosion and profit 
shifting” or “BEPS” project). Source countries are actively designing 
tax base defense mechanisms to supplement their income tax 
collection efforts.138  
As source countries attempt to defend their tax base from 
artificial shifting of income out of their tax base and into low tax 
jurisdictions, scholars have increasingly argued that formulary 
apportionment principles will be required to prevent artificial profits-
 
 133. Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934). 
 134. See Bret Wells, “Territorial” Tax Reform: Homeless Income is the Achilles Heel, 12 
Hous. B. & Tax L.J. 1, 39 (2012). 
 135. G20, G20 Leaders Declaration, at ¶48, G20 at Los Cabos, Mexico (June 18–19, 
2012), https://www.g20.org/sites/default/files/g20_resources/library/G20_Leaders_Decla
ration_Final_Los_Cabos.pdf. 
 136. Prime Minister’s Office & Cabinet Office, G8 factsheet: tax (html), GOV.UK (June 
7, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g8-factsheet-tax/g8-factsheet-tax. 
 137. The OECD has established a website to organize the various reports, press releases, 
and conference calls, and other activities related to its base erosion and profit shifting initiative 
at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps.htm. A discussion of the BEPS project is beyond the scope 
of this article, but for further study, see Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 
55 (2014). 
 138. See Bret Wells & Cym Lowell, Tax Base Erosion and Homeless Income: Collection at 
Source is the Linchpin, 965 TAX L. REV. 535, 599–602 (2012). 
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shifting through intercompany arrangements.139 Thus, it is 
foreseeable that countries will increasingly disregard intercompany 
transfer pricing agreements and instead choose to exercise their 
“power to condition, limit, or deny deductions from gross income in 
order to arrive at the net that it chooses to tax”140 to prevent an 
inappropriate erosion of their corporate tax base at the hands of 
profit-shifting strategies of multinational enterprises. 
The introduction of such tax base protection limitations creates 
uniquely complex U.S. foreign tax credit issues under the 1983 final 
regulations.141 This foreseeable evolution poses no significant impact 
to multinational enterprises incorporated in jurisdictions that do not 
attempt to tax extra-territorial business income. But, the thesis of 
this Article is that the United States will continue to assert residency-
based worldwide taxation (either on a current or deferred basis) on 
the extra-territorial income earned by U.S. multinational enterprises, 
and as a result, the design challenge for the U.S. government is to 
ensure that its foreign tax credit regime is flexible enough to provide 
coherent foreign tax credit relief in the midst of these foreseeable 
BEPS responses.  
International double income taxation should be avoided except 
to the extent that denial of foreign tax credit relief represents a 
necessary attack on objectionable foreign tax credit transactions. The 
formalistic predominant character standard was designed as a 
duplicative attack on yesterday’s disguised oil royalty problem, but 
these backward looking regulations are ill-suited for the challenging 
foreign tax credit issues of today. The continued existence of the 
formalistic predominant character standard set forth in the 1983 
final regulations creates unnecessary risks of international double 
income taxation without a compelling policy reason for doing so (in 
fact, there is a compelling policy reason based on competitiveness 
reasons to minimize unnecessary international double 
income taxation). 
 
 139. See Reuven Avi-Yonah & Ilan Benshalom, Formulary Apportionment—Myths and 
Prospects, 2011 WORLD TAX J. 371 (2011); Reuven Avi-Yonah, Kimberly Clausing & Michael 
Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 
9 FLA. TAX REV. 497 (2009). 
 140. Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934). 
 141. See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Should the U.S. Dictate World Tax Policy? Reflections on PPL 
Corporation v. Commissioner, 138 TAX NOTES INT’L 871 (2013). 
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For example, if a country were to adopt a separate thin 
capitalization regime as an alternative minimum tax regime, the 
“separate levy rule” would require this separate foreign levy to be 
individually tested to determine whether this component part of the 
income tax law is considered to be an income tax in the U.S. sense. 
In prior temporary regulations, the Treasury Department had 
provided a comforting example that had favorably dealt with thin 
capitalization regimes,142 but this example was deleted from the 1983 
final regulations.143 Instead of providing guidance in this situation, 
the 1983 final regulations state in conclusory fashion that a foreign 
tax levy be considered an income tax only in rare circumstances when 
such levy disallows significant expenses. The regulations also state 
that if significant expenses are disallowed, it must be shown that the 
foreign levy will nevertheless be “almost certain to reach some net 
gain” notwithstanding the expense disallowance aspects of the 
foreign tax levy.144 Thus, a tax on gross receipts or on gross income 
satisfies the net income test only if all significant expenses are 
deductible or if the foreign levy is “almost certain to reach some net 
gain.”145 Now that the United States has its own form of thin 
capitalization regime,146 one would hope that a plain textual 
interpretation of the net income test set forth in the 1983 final 
regulations would not cause a foreign thin capitalization regime to 
fail the net income test. However, the 1983 final regulations are 
purposely silent on this point.147 
The availability of U.S. foreign tax credit relief, however, 
becomes more doubtful under a plain textual reading of the 1983 
final regulations if the foreign country adopts an alternative 
minimum asset tax regime in lieu of disallowing related party 
expenses via a “thin capitalization” regime. In this regard, many 
 
 142. Temp. Treas. Reg. §4.901-2(e), Ex. (24) (1980). 
 143. In the preamble to the final regulations, the Treasury Department explained this 
deletion on the grounds that the government wanted to “avoid the possible implication that a 
tax that disallowed additional deductions [beyond those set forth in the example] would not 
meet the net income test,” but it would have been much preferred if the regulations would 
have retained this example and given a further clarifying statement about how foreign country 
base protecting measures would be analyzed under these rules. See T.D. 7918, 1983-2 
C.B. 113. 
 144. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(4), (b)(4). 
 145. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i)(B) (emphasis added). 
 146. See § 163(j). 
 147. See Treas. Reg § 1.901-2. 
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Latin American countries have relied on alternative minimum asset 
tax regimes to backstop their broad-based general income tax 
regime.148 These countries have viewed asset tax regimes as a 
necessary anti-abuse measure to protect against base erosion from 
aggressive inbound tax planning.149 Asset taxes generally range from 
0.2% to 2% and indirectly represent a limit on thinly capitalized 
companies.150 Some form of asset tax has been enacted in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Venezuela.151 Further, in order to 
identify a taxpayer’s net assets, for example, Mexico allows taxpayers 
to reduce their net assets by the amount of debt that was payable to 
other Mexican non-financial institutions, but does not allow 
deduction for cross-border related-party debt.152 Again, Mexico is 
attempting to defend its income tax base against base 
erosion strategies.153 
Prior to the 1983 final regulations, a business asset tax enacted 
to complement a country’s collection of its general income taxes 
would probably have been viewed as a creditable foreign tax under 
prior authority.154 In fact, the Argentine government adopted its 
business asset tax only after it received assurance from the 
International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) that the Argentine asset tax 
would be creditable in the United States.155 The Argentine 
 
 148. Argentina, 1995 Income and Capital Tax Convention and Final Protocol, 
Argentina-Denmark, art. 30, Sep. 4, 1997 96 TNI 234–34, Chile, Phillip R. West, Across the 
Great Divide: A Centrist Tax Reform Proposal, 130 TAX NOTES 1025, 1033 (Feb. 28, 2011), 
and Peru, William J. Gibbons, Tax Effects of Basing International Business Abroad, 69 HARV. 
L. REV. 1206, 1249 (1956), have all enacted thin capitalization rules. Thus, perhaps the trend 
to use a limitation on interest expense deductions will be a growing trend in Latin America 
as well. 
 149. See, e.g., For Argentina, Dictamen D.A.L. 55/99 (25 June 1999). The theory for an 
asset tax is that a business asset should generate at least a minimum level amount of income (a 
return on asset) over a reasonable period of time. If this is not the case and the business is 
continued, then the assumption must be that there is unreported income. See Bret Wells, Tax-
Effective Methods to Finance Latin American Operations, 28 INT’L TAX J. 21 (2002). 
 150. See John McLees, The Business Asset Tax, 93 TAXES NOTES TODAY 175-24 (Sept. 
10, 1993). 
 151. See, e.g., id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See Rev. Rul. 67-329, 1967-2 C.B. 257; see also Rev. Rul. 73-117, 1973-1 C.B. 344; 
Rev. Rul. 78-62, 1978-1 C.B. 226. 
 155. Stephen Hodge, Argentine Tax On Minimum Presumed Income, U.S. Foreign Tax 
Credit Out of Sync, 2001 TAX NOTES TODAY 85-39. 
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government was later surprised to find out that the IMF’s assurances 
that the Argentine asset tax would be entitled to U.S. foreign tax 
credit relief were incorrect.156 With the notable exception of the 
United States, a survey of existing worldwide tax treaties reveals a 
broad international consensus that asset tax regimes implemented as 
part of the overall general income taxes of a foreign country should 
be eligible for foreign tax credit relief under bilateral income tax 
treaties around the world.157  
 
 156. Id. 
 157. This is recognized explicitly in many treaties. The Argentina-Spain Tax Treaty Art. 
2(3)(b) and Art. 23(1), Mar. 11, 2013, 69 TNI 1128, Doc. 2013-6458; Mexico-Chile Tax 
Treaty Art. 2(3)(b)(ii) and Art. 23(1)(1). Agreement between the United Mexican States and 
the Republic of Chile for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital (with protocol), Mex.-Chile, Apr. 
17, 1998, 2484 U.N.T.S. 350; Convention Between the Republic of Venezuela and the Swiss 
Confederation for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and on 
Capital, Switz.-Venez., art. 2(3)(b)(ii) & 23, Dec. 23, 1997, 2235 U.N.T.S. 39782 (325); 
Convention Between the Kingdom of Norway and the Republic of Venezuela for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Avoidance and Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Nor.-Venez., art. 2(3)(a)(ii) & 24(2)(a), Oct. 29, 
1997, 98 TNI 23-25; Doc 98-4933; Mexico-Denmark Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(a)(ii) and Art. 
24(2). Convention between the United Mexican States and the Kingdom of Denmark for the 
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on 
Income and on Capital, Mex-Den., Jun. 11, 1997, 97 TNI 217-19, Doc 97-30474; 
Agreement for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion and 
Avoidance with Respect to Taxes on Income Between the Republic of Indonesia and the 
Republic of Venezuela, Indon.-Venez., art. 2(3)(a) & 23(2), Feb. 27, 1997, 2000 WTD 16-
35; Doc. 1999-39606; The Finland- Mexico Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(a)(ii) and Art. 22(2)(a). 
Agreement between the Republic of Finland and the united Mexican States for the Avoidance 
of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, 
Fin.-Mex., Feb. 12, 1997, 2124 U.N.T.S. 295; The Mexico-Venezuela Tax Treaty Art. 2(3) 
and Art. 22(3). Convention Between the Republic of Venezuela and the United States of 
Mexico for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income, Mex.-Venez., Feb. 6, 1997, 97 TNI 172-22; Doc 97-24843 
(states asset taxes of both countries are considered income taxes); Convention Between the 
Government of the Republic of Venezuela and the Government of the Republic of Trinidad 
and Tobago for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion and 
Avoidance with Respect to Taxes on Income and for the Encouragement of International 
Trade and Investment (with protocol), Trin. & Tobago-Venez., art. 2(3)(b) & 23(1), July 31, 
1996, 2407 U.N.T.S. 43447 (3); The Venezuela-Czech Republic Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(b)(ii) 
and Art. 23(2), April 26, 1996, Doc. 96-30053, 96 TNI 227-29; The Mexico-Italy Tax Treaty 
Art. 2(3)(a) and Art. 22(2). Convention between the United Mexican States and the Italian 
Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Mex.-It., July 8, 1991, 97 TNI 109-27; Doc 97-16427; 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains (with exchange of notes), U.K.-Venez., art. 
2(1)(b)(ii) & 22(1)(a), Mar. 11, 1996, 1972 U.N.T.S. 33711 (141); Art. 2(3)(b)(ii) and Art. 
23(4) of the Argentina-United Kingdom Tax Treaty; Art. 2(3)(b) (January 3, 1996, 93 TNI 
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Even though out-of-step with international norms, the IRS has 
ruled that the “separate levy rule” requires an asset tax to be 
separately tested.158 When so tested under the formalistic 
predominant character standard set forth in the 1983 final 
regulations, such levies fail to qualify for U.S. foreign tax credit relief 
because they fail to meet the realization test, the gross receipts test, 
and the net income test.159 Given the broad international consensus 
that foreign tax credit relief should be available for alternative 
minimum taxes such as asset taxes, the fundamental question is: what 
is the U.S. tax policy justification for this incoherent divergence from 
this international consensus, particularly when the disallowance of 
U.S. foreign tax credit relief subjects U.S. taxpayers to prejudicial 
double international income taxation even though no “disguised 
royalty problem” is implicated? 
 
251-52, Doc. 96-31575); The Mexico-Norway Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(a)(ii) and Art. 24(8). 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income and on Capital, Mex.-Nor., Mar. 23, 1995, 1947 U.N.T.S. 166; 
The Argentina-Denmark Tax Treaty, Art. 2(3)(b)(ii) and Art. 24(2), December 12, 1995, 96 
TNI 234-34, Doc 96-31248; See The Argentina-Canada Tax Treaty, Art. 2(3)(b)(ii) and Art. 
23(1)(a), Dec. 30, 1994, 2027 UNTS 407; The Argentina-Finland Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(b) 
and Art. 23(1)(a)(ii), December 13, 1994, 96 TNI 30-25; Doc 96-2267; The South Korea-
Mexico Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(a)(ii) and Art. 23(4). Convention for the Avoidance of Double 
Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (with 
protocol), S. Kor.-Mex., Oct. 6, 1994, 1873 U.N.T.S. 139; The Netherlands-Mexico Tax 
Treaty Art. 2(1)(b) and Art. 22(2). Agreement between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and 
the United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (with protocol), Neth.-Mex., Sept. 27, 1993, 2217 
U.N.T.S. 105; The Mexico-Germany Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(a) and Art. 23(2)(b). Agreement 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital (with 
protocol), Mex.-Ger., Feb. 23, 1993, 1764 U.N.T.S. 204; The Mexico-Sweden Tax Treaty 
Art. 2(1)(a)(ii) and Art. 22(3). Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the 
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income (with protocol), Mex.-Swed., 
Sept. 21, 1992, 1719 U.N.T.S. 407; The Spain-Mexico Tax Treaty Art. 2(3)(b) and Art. 
23(1). Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fraud and 
Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital (with protocol), Spain-Mex., Jul. 
24, 1992, 1832 U.N.T.S. 179; The Mexico-France Tax Treaty Art. 2(2)(b)(ii) and Art. 
21(1)(a). Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal 
Evasion With Respect to Taxes on Income, Mex.-Fr., Nov. 7, 1991, 1719 U.N.T.S. 330; 
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with 
Respect to Taxes on Income (with protocol), Can.-Mex. Art. 22(1), Apr. 8, 1991, 1883 
U.N.T.S. 350 (349). 
 158. See Rev. Rul. 91-45, 1991-2 C.B.336. 
 159. Id. Admittedly, Rev. Rul. 91-45 would allow § 901 relief to apply if the Mexican 
asset tax payments were refunded and regular income tax payments were later made, but this 
requires the foreign country to carefully craft its asset tax laws; other Latin American countries 
with similar asset taxes have not done so, and it is difficult to articulate why they should. 
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Another tax base protection device that source countries have 
enacted specifically for inbound activities are presumptive tax 
regimes. Under a presumptive tax regime, a tax is paid on certain 
categories of transactions based on turn-over, gross revenue,160 or on 
net capital gains. Source countries have found it difficult to collect 
taxes from offshore investors. In response, several countries have 
implemented presumptive tax regimes that impose a reduced tax rate 
on the net capital gain or on the gross turnover of a particular 
activity as a minimum income tax regime while still retaining their 
general income tax regimes. Again, these alternative minimum tax 
regimes deal with the practical difficulty of preserving to the source 
country a practical means of collecting the expected “right amount” 
of income tax while avoiding intractable cross-border transfer 
pricing controversies.  
Early case law and IRS rulings were supportive of such 
“backstop” regimes and generally held that the taxes paid under such 
alternative minimum tax regimes would be entitled to U.S. foreign 
tax credit relief if they were part of the country’s general income tax 
laws and designed to “backstop” the effective collection of the 
general income tax of the country.161 In contrast to the holistic 
overall approach utilized in prior case law, the “separate levy rule” 
coupled with the three-pronged “predominant character standard” 
set forth in the 1983 final regulations requires that these 
complimentary regimes be separately tested to determine their 
eligibility. When so tested, these minimum tax regimes may fail the 
formal design requirements of the three-pronged “predominant 
character standard.”162 Even though the intent of such “backstop” 
 
 160. Because cross-border transfer pricing compliance is difficult, Brazil has instituted a 
regime that presumes that all related-party exports have at least a presumptive profit margin 
and the tax on this presumptive margin is required to be paid. See Yoon Chung Kim and Sonia 
Zapata, Taxation in Latin America: Brazil ¶ 5.11(e) (IBFD 2001). This regime attempts to 
deal with the base erosion opportunities through a collection mechanism designed to 
“backstop” the country’s general income tax laws. In some cases, the “in lieu” provisions of 
section 903 may be available to provide relief, but this is only the case where the presumptive 
tax regime is in complete substitution for (and not complimentary of) the generally applicable 
income tax regime. See § 903; Treas. Reg. § 1.903-1(b)(1) (“a foreign tax satisfies the 
substitution requirement if the tax in fact operates as a tax imposed in substitution for, and not 
in addition to, an income tax”). 
 161. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 800 (1926); see Burk Bros. v. Comm’r of I.R.S., 20 
B.T.A. 657, 661 (1930). 
 162. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(b)(4)(i)(B) (2010); Rev. Rul. 76-215, 1976-1 C.B. 194; 
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,087 (Sept. 12, 1979); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,587 (Feb. 
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regimes is to collect the “expected right” amount of income tax in a 
way that defends against tax base erosions strategies, the three-part 
predominant character standard (if faithfully applied) leads to an 
incoherent conclusion. These presumptive tax regimes fail to meet 
the formalistic net income test set forth in the regulations and thus 
are ineligible for U.S. foreign tax credit relief except in the limited 
situation where the presumptive tax regime represents a complete 
substitution163 (and not simply a complementary regime) for the 
foreign country’s general income tax laws. 
Perhaps the most significant indictment on the 1983 final 
regulations is the fact that the Internal Revenue Service has ignored 
these regulations in several recent rounds of guidance on innovative 
foreign formulary tax levies that were adopted as part of a foreign 
country’s income tax laws.164 In this regard, Mexico enacted a new 
tax in 2008 called the impuesto empresarial a tasa única (IETU) and 
repealed the IETU as of January 1, 2014. The main goal of this tax 
was to fight tax evasion with Mexico’s underground economy by 
requiring companies that do a large amount of business in cash to 
pay a 2 percent tax (increased to 3 percent as of January 1, 2010) on 
the deposit of currency above MXN 25,000. The IETU’s explicit 
goal was to stop tax evasion, so the tax did not target compliant 
taxpayers. The IETU was creditable against federal Mexican income 
tax. Because this tax did not allow deductions, tax scholars165 and the 
tax practitioner community understood that this tax failed to meet 
 
17, 1976); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-32-003 (May 30, 1995); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-
13-001 (Apr. 26, 1995); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2003-31-001 (Apr. 1, 2003). The case law 
requires that in order for taxes paid under such complementary tax regimes to be eligible for 
U.S. foreign tax credit relief, such tax regimes must be likely to reach net gain. See Bank of 
Am. Nat’l Tr. & Sav. Ass’n v. United States, 459 F.2d 513 (Ct. Cl. 1972), cert. denied, 409 
U.S. 949 (1972); Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 677 F.2d 72 (Ct. Cl. 1982). Simplified tax 
regimes have represented income taxes in the U.S. sense only when the courts were convinced 
that deductions were allowed that compensated for the non-deductibility of significant 
business expenses. See Exxon Corp. Comm’r, 113 T.C. 338, 1999 WL 98398 (1999); 
Texasgulf, Inc. v. Comm’r, 172 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 1999), aff’g 107 T.C. 51 (1996). 
 163. Section 903 provides an alternative basis for foreign tax credit relief, but the “in lieu 
of” tax must be completely in lieu of any further application of the country’s income tax laws. 
See Treas. Reg. § 1.903-1(b)(1). 
 164. See text accompanying notes 143–52. 
 165. See David Cameron, PPL: Where’s the Treaty Argument?, 2013 WTD 44-11, Tax. 
Doc. 2013-2888 (Mar. 6, 2013). 
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the formalistic predominant character standard set forth in the 1983 
final regulations.166  
Instead of issuing a ruling that set forth this incoherent result, 
the IRS issued Notice 2008-3, 2008-1 C.B. 253, which instead 
provided an incoherent rationale. In this ruling, the Internal 
Revenue Service said that this tax needed “study” and that “the IRS 
will not challenge a taxpayer’s position that the IETU is an income 
tax that is eligible for a credit.” The Internal Revenue Service 
allowed interim creditability for the IETU without providing any 
coherent rationale for how this tax satisfied the three-part standard 
set forth in Regulation section 1.901-2(b). The reality was, and is, 
that the Internal Revenue Service simply did not want to apply its 
own overly formalistic section 901 regulations because doing so 
would create an incoherent outcome. However, to achieve this 
coherent result the IRS needed to issue a ruling that was devoid of 
any coherent rationale. 
In 2010, Puerto Rico imposed a formulary excise tax on 
multinational enterprises operating in its borders Nevertheless, the 
Internal Revenue Service, instead of faithfully applying its existing 
1983 final regulations and then applying the completely “in lieu of” 
standard of section 903, stated in Notice 2011-29, 2011-16 I.R.B. 
663, that the provisions of this excise tax “were novel.” Because this 
excise tax qualified as “novel,” the Internal Revenue Service further 
stated that “pending resolution of these issues, the IRS will not 
challenge a taxpayer’s position that the Excise Tax is a tax in lieu of 
an income tax.” Thus, again, without any coherent explanation, the 
Internal Revenue Service stated that it would not challenge foreign 
tax credit eligibility even though it did not (and in this author’s 
opinion could not)167 articulate a coherent rationale for allowing 
credit relief. Because the existing foreign tax credit regulations (if 
faithfully followed) create incoherent outcomes, these existing 
regulations are ill-suited for the issues presented in today’s era. As a 
consequence, the IRS is developing a de facto administrative law that 
is unsupported by existing regulations. 
 
 166. See Randall Jackson, From the Archives: When Is a Foreign Tax Creditable in the 
U.S.?, 2014 WTD 248-4, Tax. Doc. 2014-29957 (Dec. 29, 2014). 
 167. Others have reached the same conclusion. See Martin A. Sullivan, Puerto Rico Shows 
Tax Policy at Its Best and Worst, 77 TAX NOTES INT’L 467 (2015); Martin A. Sullivan, 
Economic Analysis: The Treasury’s Bailout of Puerto Rico, 73 TAX NOTES INT’L 267 (2014). 
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In 2008, the United Kingdom imposed a fixed £30,000 levy on 
U.K. non-domiciliary taxpayers.168 In Rev. Rul. 2011-19, 2011-36 
I.R.B. 119, the Internal Revenue Service reached a coherent 
outcome by allowing this tax to be eligible for U.S. foreign tax credit 
relief. However, to reach this coherent outcome, the IRS made the 
assertion that this levy was likely to reach net income even though it 
was a fixed amount and did not provide any deductions. As the press 
had reported, this ruling cannot be reconciled with the existing 
three-part predominant character standard in Regulation section 
1.901-2(b).169 Even worse, the Internal Revenue Service does not try 
to articulate a coherent rationale for how to harmonize this 
allowance of foreign tax credit relief with the standards set forth in 
its regulatory regime. 
On December 10, 2014, the United Kingdom published 
proposed legislation that would attempt to assert U.K. taxing 
jurisdiction over diverted profits, which the legislation defined as 
arrangements that erode the U.K. tax base.170 The U.K. diverted 
profits tax applies when there is not a U.K. permanent establishment 
or when U.K. origin profits, under transfer pricing arrangements, are 
shifted to offshore entities that pay low amounts of tax and lack of 
economic substance in their country of residence.171 This legislation 
became effective on April 1, 2015.172  
This proposed diverted profits legislation is designed to protect 
the U.K. corporate tax base from base erosion and profit shifting 
techniques of multinational enterprises, but does so by disallowing 
some substantial business expenditures. Thus, this diverted profits 
legislation attempts to ensure that income taxes on net income 
derived in the United Kingdom are taxed in the United Kingdom, 
but this regime is unlikely to meet the formalistic predominant 
character standard in the 1983 final regulations because it does not 
guarantee that all substantial business expenses are entitled to cost 
 
 168. Notice 2011-29. 
 169. See Lee A. Sheppard, Does the U.K. Diverted Profits Tax Qualify for the Foreign Tax 
Credit, 146 TAX NOTES 159 (Jan. 12, 2015). 
 170. See HM Revenue & Customs, Overview of Legislation in Draft at 14 (Dec. 10, 
2014), available at Tax. Doc. 2014-29148. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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recovery.173 But again, as the IRS has now repeatedly ignored its own 
regulations, it is uncertain what it will do with respect to this new 
measure. The U.K. diverted profits legislation is clearly aimed at 
defending the U.K. income tax base by “conditioning, limiting, or 
denying deductions from gross income in order to arrive at the net 
that [the U.K.] chooses to tax.”174 Recent news reports indicate that 
other countries are considering similar diverted profits measures to 
protect their income tax base from the BEPS phenomenon.175 
Viewed in its totality, these recent developments demonstrate that 
the formalistic predominant character standard set forth in the 1983 
final regulations is ill-suited to address innovative legislation and thus 
poses a serious risk that U.S. multinational enterprises would be 
unable to obtain U.S. foreign tax credit relief.  
Consequently this analysis underscore the current reality: the 
formalistic predominant character176 standard in the 1983 final 
regulations is ill-suited for providing coherent outcomes given how 
other countries are designing their tax systems to address the 
BEPS phenomenon. 
5. Final reassessment of the formalistic predominant character 
standard (not good) 
For the reasons set forth in the preceding sections, the Treasury 
Department should amend Regulation section 1.901-2(b) to replace 
the predominate character standard with a more holistic approach 
that is consistent with the pre-1983 case law. The historic rationale 
for infusing formal requirements into the regulatory predominant 
character standard is adequately addressed by Regulation section 
 
 173. See Lee A. Sheppard, Does the U.K. Diverted Profits Tax Qualify for the Foreign Tax 
Credit, 146 TAX NOTES 159 (Jan. 12, 2015). But see Philip Wagman, The U.K. Diverted 
Profits Tax: Selected U.S. Tax Considerations, 147 TAX NOTES 1413 (June 22, 2015) (although 
recognizing that the law is unsettled, the author argues that “[i]t might be argued that the 
[U.K. diverted profits tax] authorization of recharacterizations in which related-party 
deductions are denied, in circumstances suggesting possible inappropriate base stripping, 
represents a reasonable limit on deductions for costs and expenses that is reasonable under the 
section 901 regulations”). 
 174. See text accompanying note 133. 
 175. Mindy Herzfeld, PEs and FTCs: Who Wins, Who Loses?, 2015 WTD 80-1, Tax Doc. 
2015-9705 (Apr. 27, 2015). 
 176. See generally Ryan Finley, Treasury Undecided on Creditability of U.K. Diverted 
Profits Tax, 2015 TNT 207-6, Tax. Doc. 2015-23734 (Oct. 27, 2015). 
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1.901-2A without the need for further complexity.177 In addition, the 
Court’s reinterpretation of the standard in the PPL case places a 
heavy judicial gloss on the 1983 final regulations to harmonize them 
with prior case law when, in fact, the intended plain meaning of the 
1983 final regulations was to supplant the more holistic analysis of 
pre-1983 case law.178 Moreover, the 1983 final regulations articulate 
a net income standard that is inconsistent with how the U.S. income 
tax laws have been characterized by the Supreme Court’s Indopco 
decision where the Court stated that the taxpayer did not need to be 
afforded a deduction for all substantial expenditures in order to 
clearly reflect income in the U.S. sense.179 And, worse yet, the 
Internal Revenue Service has issued public guidance that side-steps 
the need to apply the government’s own regulations, thus creating 
an administrative working law that is incoherent, unexplained, and 
irreconcilable with the existing 1983 final regulations. Each of these 
examples points to an irreconcilable conflict: to achieve a “coherent 
outcome” in important fact patterns, Regulation section 1.901-2(b) 
cannot be applied in a “coherent manner” because this regulation (if 
literally applied) logically leads to incoherent and unjust outcomes. 
It is now time for the Treasury Department to issue new 
regulatory guidance so that its section 901 regulations provide a 
standard that, when transparently applied, affords coherent foreign 
tax credit outcomes. The existing 1983 final regulations are 
inflexible, ignored by the government, and were reinterpreted by the 
Supreme Court in PPL in a “substance over form” manner to afford 
coherent outcomes. These regulations need to be revised to 
eliminate unnecessary uncertainty and unhelpful controversy. 
Regulation section 1.901-2(b) represents a look backwards to 
yesterday’s disguised oil royalty problem when these regulations 
instead should be forward-looking to address the foreign tax credit 
eligibility standards that are appropriate for a world where formulary 
or presumptive tax protection measures are likely to be embedded 
within the country’s income tax laws. Given that the United States 
needs its foreign tax credit regime to appropriately mesh with the 
 
 177. Professor Coven urged the Treasury Department to remove this requirement fifteen 
years ago, and the PPL decision only adds more force to that argument. See Coven, supra note 
49, at 127. 
 178. For the rationale of these formalistic changes, see the discussion in Section II.A.1. 
 179. Indopco v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992). 
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foreign tax regimes of other nations, the Treasury Department 
should immediately open a regulatory project to rewrite Regulation 
section 1.901-2(b) so that the faithful application of the 
government’s foreign tax credit regulations does not result in 
disallowing U.S. foreign tax credit relief for foreign income taxes 
that are paid in non-objectionable situations. 
Because the Treasury Department redundantly solved the 
disguised oil royalty problem with its dual capacity taxpayer 
regulations contained in Regulation section 1.901-2A, the section 
907 limitation regime also has become redundant as it tries to attack 
the already adequately addressed disguised oil royalty problem in 
another manner.180 Therefore, Congress should repeal section 907 as 
its legitimate concerns have already been addressed by the Treasury 
Department through the issuance of the dual capacity taxpayer 
regulations of section 1.901-2A. The cross-crediting concerns raised 
by high extraction taxes needed a response, but generated three 
redundant responses. Now is the time to remove the needless 
complexity of the extra two responses, which include the formalistic 
aspects of the predominant character standard and the specialized 
section 907 limitation regime that applies to extraction taxes. 
B. Blitzkrieg Against Compaq-Style Financial Arbitrage Transactions 
In the 1990s, the government’s war on objectionable foreign tax 
credit transactions moved away from extraction taxes and settled into 
a fight over the cross-crediting of excess foreign tax credits generated 
by abusive financial arbitrage transactions. In Notice 98-5, the 
government expressed strong hostility toward taxpayer attempts to 
cross-credit taxes generated in abusive financial arbitrage transactions 
and identified five transactions of interest to discuss the contours of 
its policy concerns.181 The Treasury Department argued that each of 
the five transactions of interest set forth in Notice 98-5 lacked 
economic substance because they made no sense apart from their 
generation of U.S. foreign tax credit benefits. When a transaction 
only has an economic justification when considering the U.S. tax 
savings from excess U.S. foreign tax credits, then the transaction 
does not have a sufficient non-tax business purpose, at least 
 
 180. See supra note 46. 
 181. 1998-1 C.B. 334, withdrawn by Notice 2004-19, 2004-1 C.B. 606. 
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according to Notice 98-5. Again, the fundamental point is that the 
government signaled a willingness to restrict foreign tax credit 
eligibility standards as a means to attack the cross-crediting of excess 
credits generated from “objectionable transactions.” Section 904, 
which was designed in 1921 to handle the cross-crediting 
phenomenon, was perceived as ill-suited for the abusive transaction 
of concern. 
The formulation of the economic substance doctrine set forth in 
Notice 98-5 was challenged in Compaq Computer v. Commissioner.182 
Compaq had recognized a long-term capital gain of approximately 
$232 million.183 Upon learning of this capital gain, an investment 
banker structured a series of financial transactions that allowed 
Compaq to purchase ten million Royal Dutch ADRs for 
approximately $887.6 million cum-dividend, and to sell these shares 
ex-dividend for approximately $868.4 million.184 Compaq, using the 
“next-day” settlement rules, settled the purchase-trades on 
September 17, 1992.185 However, for the sale-trades, Compaq used 
regular settlement rules and settled the sales-portion of the 
transaction on September 21, 1992.186 As a result of the difference in 
settlement dates, Compaq was the owner of ten million Royal Dutch 
ADRs on the dividend record date of September 18 and thus was 
entitled to receive a dividend of approximately $22.5 million.187 The 
Dutch withholding taxes on this dividend were approximately $3.4 
million, so Compaq actually received a net dividend of $19.1 
million.188 Compaq also incurred transaction costs on the trades 
totaling $1.5 million.189 Thus, the transaction (which was completed 
in approximately one hour) created a net cash loss of approximately 
$1.6 million to Compaq as follows: 
 







 182. Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 785 (5th Cir. 2001), rev’g 113 
T.C. 214 (1999); see IES Indus. v. U.S., 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001) (same). 
 183. Compaq Comput. Corp., 113 T.C. at 215. 
 184. Id. at 217–18. 
 185. Id. at 218. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. at 219. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 221. 
1895 The Foreign Tax Credit War 
 1945 
ADR Sale Price   $868.40 
  Investment Banker 
Fees    
<$1.5> 
  ADR Purchase Price   <$887.6> 
  Capital Loss   
 
<$20.7> <$20.7> 
Dividend (Gross of 
$22.5 less $3.4 

























 Regarding the above facts, the Tax Court denied foreign tax 
credit relief because the financial arbitrage transaction lacked an 
adequate non-tax business purpose due to the fact that Compaq’s 
trades were pre-wired, created a negative cash flow of $1.6 million, 
and were done solely to generate $3.4 million of U.S. foreign tax 
credits.190 The Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s decision, 
agreeing with Compaq that the gross dividend is used to determine 
whether there was a pre-tax profit motive and concluding that a pre-
tax profit was the only prerequisite for the transaction to have an 
adequate business purpose and possess economic substance.191 Thus, 
according to the Fifth Circuit, as long as Compaq possessed a pre-tax 
 
 190. Id. at 222, 225. The Tax Court used the economic substance doctrine to deny U.S. 
foreign tax credit benefits in this transaction, claiming that Compaq failed to possess a 
sufficient non-tax business purpose and was motivated solely by the desire to obtain U.S. 
foreign tax credit benefits. In the course of its opinion, the Tax Court reasoned as follows: 
The foreign tax credit serves to prevent double taxation and to facilitate 
international business transactions. No bona fide business is implicated here, and we 
are not persuaded that Congress intended to encourage or permit a transaction such 
as the ADR transaction, which is merely a manipulation of the foreign tax credit to 
achieve U.S. tax savings. 
Compaq Comput. Corp, 113 T.C. at 225. 
 191. The Fifth Circuit reversed the Tax Court’s application of the economic substance 
doctrine, reasoning that Compaq’s economic profit is to be judged by looking at its pre-tax 
gross dividend and stating that foreign income taxes should not be considered as an expense, 
thus rejecting Notice 98-5’s interpretation of the economic substance doctrine. Compaq 
Comput. v. Comm’r, 277 F.3d 778, 784–85 (5th Cir. 2001), rev’g 113 T.C. 214 (1999); see 
also IES Indus. v. U.S., 253 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2001). 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1946 
profit ($1.8 million in the above table), it was irrelevant that this 
pre-tax profit suffered a pre-planned effective foreign tax rate of 
189% (or $3.4 million in the above table).192 
As cases such as Compaq were making their way to the 
courthouse, Congress enacted section 901(k) in 1997 to require a 
minimum holding period as a precondition to claiming U.S. foreign 
tax credit relief for dividend withholding taxes.193 However, it 
 
 192. The government withdrew Notice 98-5 after its defeat in Compaq. See Notice 2004-
19, 2004-1 C.B. 606 (withdrawing Notice 98-5). The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Compaq was 
the subject of significant criticism by scholars. See Michael Schler, Implicit Taxes and Economic 
Substance (letter to the editor), 114 TAX NOTES 959 (Mar. 5, 2007); Michael Knoll, Implicit 
Taxes and Pretax Profit in Compaq and IES Industries, 114 TAX NOTES 679 (Feb. 12, 2007); 
Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Other’ Issues When a Tax Case Goes to Court, 101 TAX 
NOTES 1097 (Dec. 1, 2003); Bryan Camp, Form over Substance in the Fifth Circuit, 34 TEX. 
TECH. L. REV. 733, 752–62 (2003); Nicholas Gunther, Economics and Compaq v. 
Commissioner, 97 TAX NOTES 555, 555 (Oct. 28, 2002); William A. Klein & Kirk J. Stark, 
Compaq v. Commissioner-Where Is the Tax Arbitrage?, 106 TAX NOTES 1335 (Mar. 7, 2002); 
Martin J. McMahon Jr., Economic Substance, Purposive Activity, and Corporate Tax Shelters, 94 
TAX NOTES 1017, 1018 (Feb. 25, 2002); Daniel N. Shaviro & David A. Weisbach, The Fifth 
Circuit Gets it Wrong in Compaq v. Commissioner, 26 TAX NOTES INT’L 191, 192 (Jan. 28, 
2002); David P. Hariton, The Compaq Case, Notice 98-5, and Tax Shelters: The Theory is All 
Wrong, 94 TAX NOTES 501 (Jan. 28, 2002); Symposium, Tax Shelters, Tax Law, and Morality: 
Codifying Judicial Doctrines, 54 SMU L. REV. 9, 9–10 (2001); Daniel Shaviro, Economic 
Substance, Corporate Tax Shelters, and the Compaq Case, 88 TAX NOTES 221, 231–32 (July 9, 
2000); Marc D. Teitelbaum, Compaq Computer and IES Industries—The Empire Strikes Back, 
86 TAX NOTES 829 (Feb 7, 2000); Dana L. Trier, Beyond the Smell Test: The Role of Substantive 
Anti-Avoidance Rules in Addressing the Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, TAXES, 62, 65–70 
(2000); Marc D. Teitelbaum, An Alternative Analysis of the Compaq Decision (letter to the 
editor), 85 TAX NOTES 816 (Nov. 11, 1999); George K. Yin, Making Sense of the Compaq 
Computer Case (letter to the editor), 85 TAX NOTES 815 (Nov. 8, 1999); Raby & Raby, 
Economic Substance Needed for Foreign Tax Credit, 85 TAX NOTES 211 (Oct. 11, 1999); Lee A. 
Sheppard, Courts Combat Cross-Border Tax Shelters, 85 TAX NOTES 137 (Oct. 11, 1999); 
David. P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW 235 (1999). 
 193. Pub. L. No. 105-34, 1053(a), 111 Stat. 788 (1997). When Congress originally 
enacted I.R.C. § 901(k) in 1997, it required the taxpayer to hold the stock for at least sixteen 
days within a thirty-day period that included the dividend record date. Congress amended 
I.R.C. § 901(k) to change the thirty-day period to a thirty-one-day period. Pub. L. No. 108-
311, 406(g)(1), 118 Stat. 1166 (2004). Compaq attempted to dissuade the Tax Court from 
applying the judicially-created economic substance doctrine by arguing that Congress enacted 
I.R.C. § 901(k) as the limited response to these tax arbitrage transactions. The taxpayer made 
these statutory construction arguments even though the legislative history made clear that in 
its enactment of I.R.C. § 901(k) that “[n]o inference is intended as to the treatment under 
present law of tax-motivated transactions intended to transfer foreign tax credit benefits,” See 
S. REP. NO. 105-33,  at 177 (1997). Compaq’s argument, however, was as follows: 
Congress acknowledged the economic substance of the dividend arbitrage 
transaction, and used a legislative scalpel to address the perceived concern, rather 
than the judicial hatchet wielded by the Commissioner and the Tax Court. The Tax 
Court’s holding, if affirmed by this Court, would override the results mandated by 
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excepted certain foreign-licensed securities dealers from these 
holding period requirements.194 The legislative history to section 
901(k) shows that Congress’ concern was that tax-motivated 
transactions were occurring to transfer foreign tax credits in the 
marketplace in short-term trades.195 In 2004, Congress added section 
901(l) to impose a similar holding period requirement for 
instruments that incur interest withholding taxes, but again excepted 
securities dealers from these new requirements.196 Thus, even though 
 
Congress in section 901(k). Given that Congress has addressed the precise issue 
before the Court, it is particularly appropriate for the Court to decline the 
Commissioner’s invitation to judicially modify the foreign tax credit regime in the 
name of economic substance. See Brown Group, 77 F.3d at 222. The Congressional 
response to the dividend arbitrage transaction in section 901(k) confirms the 
economic substance of Compaq’s Royal Dutch dividend arbitrage transaction. 
Brief of Appellant at 36, Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Comm’r, No. 00-60648 at 36 (5th Cir. 
2001). The Tax Court rejected this argument. Compaq Comput. Corp., 113 T.C. at 225–26 
(“A transaction does not avoid economic substance scrutiny because the transaction predates a 
statute targeting the specific abuse”). But, the Fifth Circuit left this issue unaddressed in the 
course of reversing the Tax Court notwithstanding the clear statement in the legislative history 
that no inference should have been drawn from the enactment of I.R.C. § 901(k) as to the 
applicability of other doctrines to this transaction. Compaq Comput. Corp., 277 F.3d at 788 
(“It is unnecessary to reach the alternative arguments for reversal offered by Compaq: first, 
that the statutory foreign tax credit regime implicitly displaces the economic substance 
doctrine; and second, that a 1997 amendment to the foreign tax credit scheme, which added 
what is now Internal Revenue Code § 901(k), implies that ADR transactions that took place 
before the amendment are to be recognized for tax purposes.”). This episode serves as a 
warning that incomplete and ad hoc policy reforms can make things worse. 
 194. I.R.C. § 901(k)(4) (2010). Commentators indicated that this exception represented 
a compromise that allowed securities dealers to continue to benefit from these foreign tax 
credit-generating transactions, but excluded the retail user from these techniques. See Lee A. 
Sheppard, “What Did Wall Street Give Up for Deferral?” 76 TAX NOTES 1665 (Sept. 29, 
1997). However, section 901(k)(4) does not exclude a securities dealer unless it is held to be 
in active conduct in a foreign country as a securities dealer, a requirement that may prevent 
US-based securities dealers from being eligible for this exception. See Lehman Bros. Holdings, 
Inc. v. U.S., No. 10 Civ. 6200(RMB), 2015 WL 2359256, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 8, 2015). 
 195. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-148, at 545 (1997) (“[S]ome U.S. persons have engaged in 
tax-motivated transactions designed to transfer foreign tax credits from persons that are unable 
to benefit from such credits . . . to persons that can use such credits. These transactions 
sometimes involve a short-term transfer of ownership of dividend-paying shares. Other 
transactions involve the use of derivatives to allow a person that cannot benefit from the 
foreign tax credits with respect to a dividend to retain the economic benefit of the dividend 
while another person receives the foreign tax credit benefits.”); S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 175-6 
(1997) (same); Juliann Avakian Martin, Foreign Tax Credit Holding Period Proposal Generates 
Comment, 75 TAX NOTES 1038 (May 26, 1997). 
 196. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 832, 118 Stat. 1588 
(2004) (adding new § 901(l)); see also H.R. REP. NO. No. 108-755, at 621 (Oct. 7, 2004) 
(Conf. Rep.) (adopting version of the house bill); H.R. REP. NO. 108-548, at 201 (June 16, 
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Congress failed to address the fundamental tax arbitrage aspects of 
the Compaq transaction and the new minimum holding period 
requirements had selective application, these provisions demonstrate 
an attempt to deny foreign tax credit relief for objectionable short-
term financial arbitrage transactions that were executed by 
retail customers. 
In the end, Congress’s codification of the economic substance 
doctrine reversed the holdings of cases like Compaq and IES in that 
section 7701(o)(2)(B) explicitly directed the Treasury Department 
to issue regulations requiring foreign taxes to be treated as expenses 
in order to calculate the reasonably expected pre-tax profit potential 
of a transaction.197  
Thus, the remedy for the foreign tax credit generator 
transactions set forth in Notice 98-5 was legislatively codified in the 
enactment of section 7701(o)(2)(B), and specific authority was given 
to the Treasury Department to handle these objectionable 
transactions in a targeted manner under the codified economic 
substance doctrine. By directing the Treasury Department to issue 
regulations that would treat a foreign tax payment as a transactional 
expense, section 7701(o)(2)(B) sets forth a pre-tax profit test that 
coherently and holistically addresses the cross-crediting concerns of 
 
2004) (“The Committee believes that the present-law holding period requirement for claiming 
foreign tax credits with respect to dividends is too narrow in scope and, in general, should be 
extended to apply to items of income or gain other than dividends, such as interest.”). The 
determination of what risk mitigation strategies create a tolling of the holding period creates 
considerable complexity in the application of this law. Nicholas Bogos, A Risk-Based Analysis of 
Credit Derivation Under SSRP Standard (Part 1), 112 TAX NOTES 587 (Aug. 14, 2006); 
(Part 2), 112 TAX NOTES 655 (Aug. 21, 2006); (Part 3), 112 TAX NOTES 259 (Aug. 
28, 2006). 
 197. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(2)(A)(B) set forth the following criteria for analyzing 
whether a pre-tax profit potential is substantial enough to satisfy economic substance concerns: 
(2) SPECIAL RULE WHERE TAXPAYER RELIES ON PROFIT POTENTIAL— 
(A) IN GENERAL—The potential for profit of a transaction shall be taken 
into account in determining whether the requirements of subparagraphs (A) 
and (B) of paragraph (1) are met with respect to the transaction only if the 
present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit from the transaction is 
substantial in relation to the present value of the expected net tax benefits that 
would be allowed if the transaction were respected. 
(B) TREATMENT OF FEES AND FOREIGN TAXES—Fees and other 
transaction expenses shall be taken into account as expenses in determining 
pre-tax profit under subparagraph (A). The Secretary shall issue regulations 
requiring foreign taxes to be treated as expenses in determining pre-tax profit 
in appropriate cases. 
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these abusive financial arbitrage transactions where the overall 
transaction creates a cash loss to the taxpayer. Ultimately section 
901(k) and 901(l), along with their various scope limitations,198 now 
produce needless complexity. With the enactment of section 
7701(o)(2)(B), Congress should repeal sections 901(k) and (l) 
because the policy concerns that motivated their adoption are more 
appropriately solved by section 7701(o)(2)(B) without the notable 
favorable exceptions granted to securities dealers. 
C. STARS War: The Government Strikes Back (Again) 
The foreign tax credit war shifted to a more sophisticated 
variation in what the government came to call a structured passive 
investment arrangement. As indicated in the preceding section, the 
financial arbitrage transactions in Compaq and IES were uneconomic 
except for the tax credit benefits generated in those overall 
transactions. Thus, those are easy cases from an economic substance 
and business purpose perspective, despite the fact that the courts 
failed to arrive at the right answer and caused Congress to enact 
section 7701(o)(2)(B) in response. 
However, the next generation of financial arbitrage transactions 
proved to be substantially more complex while still presenting the 
same fundamental cross-crediting phenomenon. Unlike Compaq and 
IES, the highly structured financial arbitrage transactions that utilize 
a structured passive investment arrangement199 often generate an 
overall pre-tax profit even if the foreign tax cost is treated as an 
expense in the transaction. From an overall perspective, the entire 
transaction has a business purpose and makes overall economic sense. 
However, the problematic aspect of these structured passive 
investment arrangements centers on the fact that the transaction step 
that bolts-on a passive investment vehicle to an otherwise profitable 
transaction is extraneous to the underlying investment assets.  
On one hand, the bolting-on of this passive investment vehicle to 
conduct the transaction, though extraneous, provides some 
incremental pre-tax borrowing savings to the U.S. taxpayer. 
However, it also results in the U.S. taxpayer incurring a substantially 
larger incremental foreign tax cost that far exceeds the incremental 
 
 198. See I.R.C. § 901(k)(4); § 901(l)(2). 
 199. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(iv). 
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borrowing savings generated by the bolting-on of this otherwise 
extraneous passive investment vehicle.200 Thus, if the transaction step 
bolted-on to the larger transaction were isolated and separately 
tested as an independent business decision, the additional step would 
have no justifiable business purpose—its addition would be solely tax 
motivated. Said differently, the addition of this otherwise extraneous 
transaction step creates incremental financial benefits that are less 
than the incremental foreign tax cost incurred as a result of its 
addition. Importantly, in these structured passive investment 
arrangements, the taxpayer knows upfront that the incremental 
savings in borrowing cost arising from the inclusion of the otherwise 
extraneous transaction step will be less than (and often only half of) 
the amount of the incremental additional foreign tax cost incurred 
by the inclusion of the transaction step.201 
Prior to the enactment of section 7701(o), the Treasury 
Department was unsure of its prospects for victory against such 
structures, and so, yet again, it amended its section 901 regulations 
to attack this new generation of foreign tax credit generator 
transactions.202 In so doing, the Treasury Department added further 
redundant complexity and clutter to the already complex regulatory 
framework of section 901. In this regard, the Treasury Department 
 
 200. The structures vary, but the essential facts are that a foreign lender invests in a 
foreign subsidiary. For foreign tax purposes, the foreign lender is treated as a stockholder and 
is entitled to be exempt on the income from its stock investment in its resident jurisdiction. 
The foreign lender is willing to accept a lower return than would be required if the foreign 
lender made a straight taxable-interest-bearing loan. Because foreign law treats the payments 
to the foreign lender as a dividend, the structured passive investment arrangement does not 
allow the foreign subsidiary to deduct its payments to the foreign lender for foreign tax 
purposes. The incremental additional tax cost due to the foregone interest expense deduction 
is about twice as much as the reduced borrowing cost. Thus, if one were to view the addition 
of this bolt-on structured passive investment arrangement in isolation, the pre-tax benefits are 
significantly less than the foreign tax cost of engaging in this structure. But, the ability to 
cross-credit the foreign taxes against other low tax income makes the transaction economical. 
 201. See e.g., Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 543, 561 (2013), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 786 F.3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Bx payment, or interest rebate, was 
equal to 51% of the foreign tax cost); see also Expert Report of Michael I. Cragg at ¶ 76; Salem 
Fin., Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 543, 561 (2013), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 786 
F.3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 202. See T.D. 9535, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,038 (July 18, 2011) (finalized in final regulations 
the regulatory rules for structured passive investment arrangements); T.D. 9416, 73 Fed. Reg. 
40,727 (July 16, 2008) (made amendments to regulations in unrelated areas); Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,081 (Mar. 30, 2007) (announced special rules for 
structured passive investment arrangements in proposed regulations). 
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created a rifle-short provision in Regulation section 1.901-
2(e)(5)(iv) that treats any tax payment made as part of a structured 
passive investment arrangement as a “voluntary” (non-compulsory) 
foreign tax payment. By classifying taxes generated in a structured 
passive investment arrangement as “voluntary,” these taxes fail to 
meet the basic requirement of a “foreign tax” as a foreign tax must 
be a compulsory, rather than voluntary, payment in order to be 
eligible under section 901 for U.S. foreign tax credit relief.203 In its 
attack on these structures, the Treasury Department provided a 
highly stylized set of factors that must be satisfied before an 
investment structure would be classified as a “structured passive 
investment arrangement.”204  
Because these regulations did not seek to weigh the tax and non-
tax benefits of such structured passive investment arrangements, and 
because this regulatory prescription only applies to structures that 
met a formal six-part test, several comments were submitted to the 
Treasury Department. The comments stated that these regulations 
were under-inclusive because they did not address objectionable 
foreign tax credit benefits generated in analogous abusive structures, 
and yet were also over-inclusive because the regulations could 
disallow foreign tax credit relief even if the structured investment 
had a significant non-tax purpose.205 The comments went on to state 
that the better means of attacking these structured passive 
 
 203. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(iv); T.D. 9416, 73 FED. REG. 40,727 (July 16, 




 204. See Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(e)(5)(iv)(B) (setting forth six detailed criteria that must 
be met which in general are as follows: (i) a special purpose vehicle, (ii) a U.S. party exists who 
is eligible for foreign tax credit relief, (iii) direct investment is made, (iv) foreign tax credit 
benefit exists to a counterparty, (v) a foreign counterparty exists, and (vi) the U.S. party and 
foreign counterparty have inconsistent tax treatment). https://1.next.westlaw.com/
Document/N135C78F0167C11E3B490C480DE6B7DD7/View/FullText.html?transitionT
ype=UniqueDocItem&contextData=(sc.Search)&userEnteredCitation=Treas.+Reg.+1.901-2. 
 205. See Kevin Dolan, Foreign Tax Credit Generator Regs: The Purple People Eater 
Returns, 115 TAX NOTES 1155 (June 18, 2007); Comment Letter by Kevin Dolan (May 31, 
2007), available at 2007 TNT 107-52, Tax Analyst Doc. 2007-13277; Comment Letter by 
Bret Wells (Aug. 6, 2007), available at TAX NOTES TODAY, 2007 TNT 160-10, Tax Analyst 
Doc. 2007-18951. 
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investment arrangements would have been to utilize the economic 
substance doctrine.206 However, these comments were ignored.207 
Although the STARS transactions208 have created a spirited 
debate about their effectiveness under the law prior to section 
7701(o)’s enactment,209 the enactment of that section effectively 
ends that controversy. Section 7701(o) gives the government all the 
tools that it needs to deny foreign tax credit relief for foreign taxes 
generated in these so-called STARS transactions.210 An analysis of the 
key taxpayer arguments in the STARS cases and determining how 
those arguments would fare under the codified economic substance 
doctrine set forth in section 7701(o) confirms this conclusion.  
First, the taxpayers in the STARS cases argued that the economic 
substance doctrine should be applied to test only the business 
purpose for the overall transaction and not a component feature of 
an integrated transaction that has an overall business purpose.211 The 
government has largely succeeded in convincing lower courts to 
apply the judicially created economic substance doctrine on a 
disaggregated basis in the STARS transactions such that the 
investment returns that would have been earned regardless of the tax 
structure will not cause a cash negative bolt-on structure to possess a 
 
 206. Id. 
 207. See T.D. 9535, 76 Fed. Reg. 42,038 (July 18, 2011). 
 208. One of the tax products that utilized a structured passive investment vehicle was 
commonly called a “STARS” transaction.  To appropriately address the literature that deals 
with that specific context, the author refers specifically to that acronym even though the 
regulatory description of that transaction is a structured passive investment arrangement. 
 209. See Kevin Dolan, The Foreign Tax Credit Diaries—Litigation Run Amok, 140 TAX 
NOTES 1465 (2013); Jasper Cummings, Jr., The Economic Substance Doctrine as Penalty, 138 
TAX NOTES 1465 (2013); Richard Lipton, BNY and AIG—Using Economic Substance to 
Attack Transactions the Courts Do Not Like, 119 J. TAX’N 40 (July 2013); Lee Sheppard, Can 
the FTC Generator Decisions Be Reconciled? 141 TAX NOTES 451 (Nov. 4, 2013); Lee 
Sheppard, Foreign Tax Credit Generator Disallowed, 133 TAX NOTES 400 (Oct. 24, 2011); Lee 
Sheppard, Banks’ Foreign Tax Credit Arbitrage, Part 3, 116 TAX NOTES 824 (Sept. 3, 2007); 
Lee Sheppard, Banks’ Foreign Tax Credit Arbitrage, Part 2, 115 TAX NOTES 99 (Apr. 9, 
2007); Lee Sheppard, Banks’ Foreign Tax Credit Arbitrage, 2006 TNT 137-4 (July 18, 2006). 
 210. Evidently, the acronym STARS was the acronym used by the promoter of these 
passive investment trust structures and stands for Structured Trust Advantaged Repackaged 
Securities transaction. See Bank of New York Mellon v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 15, 16−17 (2013) 
(where Tax Court indicates the acronym and its origin). 
 211. See, e.g., Appellant Brief at 22, 42–56, Bank of New York Mellon v. Comm’r, 2014 
WL 2799053 (June 12, 2014); Appellant Brief at 38–40, American Int’l Group v. United 
States, 2014 WL 3402503 (June 30, 2014). 
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sufficient business purpose for its inclusion.212 Whether or not this 
success continues, section 7701(o)(5)(D) explicitly rejects the 
taxpayers’ argument by stating that the economic substance doctrine 
can be applied to an individual transaction step to determine the 
independent business purpose and economic substance of the 
particular transaction step that generates U.S. tax benefits.213 Thus, 
in years where section 7701(o)(5)(D) is effective, taxpayers will not 
be able to argue that a bolt-on extraneous tax strategy can benefit 
from being part of a larger transaction that has an overall 
business purpose. 
The second key taxpayer argument in the STARS cases is that 
foreign taxes should not be considered an expense in determining 
whether the transaction possesses a pre-tax profit motive a la Compaq 
and IES.214 Section 7701(o)(2)(B) explicitly repudiates this position 
 
 212. See Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, 112 Fed. Cl. 543 (2013). The U.S. Court of 
Federal Claims disallowed deductions and credits generated in BB&T’s participation in a 
STARS transaction by testing the trust structure as a separate step. Id. The court stated as 
follows: 
The trust creates a series of instantaneous circular cash flows starting and ending with 
BB & T where no economic activity has occurred abroad to justify the assessment of a 
U.K. tax. While inarguably sophisticated and creative, the trust purely and simply is a 
sham transaction accomplishing nothing more than a redirection of cash flows that 
should have gone to the U.S. Treasury, but instead are shared among BB & T, 
Barclays, and the U.K. Treasury. The Court finds that the trust component of STARS 
lacks economic substance. 
Aff’d in part and rev’d in part and remanded, Salem Fin., Inc. v. United States, No. 2014-
5027, 786 F.3d 932 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. denied, Sup. Ct. Dk. No. 15-380 (2016); Bank of 
New York Mellon v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 15 (2013), supplemented by T.C. Memo. 2013-225 
(2013) (found that the STARS transaction lacked economic substance by separately testing the 
business purpose and economic substance of the passive investment trust in the structure, 
stating that “the relevant transaction to be tested is the one that produces the disputed tax 
benefit, even if it is part of a larger set of transactions or steps” and that “the requirements of 
the economic substance doctrine are not avoided simply by coupling a routine transaction with 
a transaction lacking economic substance.” ); Am. Int’l Grp. v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R. 2d 
2013-1472 (D.C.N.Y. 2013) (holding that use of the structured investment vehicle had no 
economic substance or business purpose). But see Santander Holdings USA, Inc. v. U.S., 977 
F. Supp. 2d 46 (D. Mass. 2013) (refusing to disaggregate the STARS transaction to test the 
economic substance of the transaction step and instead found economic substance given the 
profitability of the overall transaction). 
 213. See I.R.C. § 7701(o)(5)(D); STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 111TH CONG., 
TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 
2010, as amended, in combination with the PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE 
ACT, at 153 (2010). 
 214. See, e.g., Appellant Brief at 37–42, Bank of New York Mellon v. Comm’r, 2014 WL 
2799053 (June 12, 2014); Appellant Brief at 40–49, American Int’l Grp. v. United States, 
2014 WL 3402503 (June 30, 2014). 
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by directing the Treasury Department to issue regulations to treat 
foreign taxes as an expense as part of the assessment of the nontax 
profit motive of the taxpayer. 
The combination of section 7701(o)’s two clarifications, 
therefore, requires courts to analyze the transaction step that 
generates excess foreign tax credits in isolation and to view any 
foreign taxes as an expense to determine the profit motive of this 
isolated step. Courts applying this methodology to STARS 
transactions, should find that the incremental foreign tax cost 
incurred as a result of the inclusion of the structured passive 
investment vehicle far exceeds the incremental expected savings in 
borrowing costs derived by including this structured passive 
investment vehicle into the overall investment strategy. Regardless of 
how these STARS cases are ultimately resolved under the judicially 
created economic substance doctrine,215 the litigating position of the 
taxpayer in those cases makes it clear that section 7701(o) should 
disallow the tax credits generated in the STARS-type transaction in 
years where the codified version of the economic substance 
doctrine applies.216 
 
 215. Taxpayers in several of these cases have petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to hear 
these cases. See, e.g., American Int’l Grp. v. United States, petition for cert. filed, (Oct. 13, 
2015) (No. 15-478); Mellon Bank of New York v. Comm.’r., petition for cert. filed, (Nov. 2, 
2015) (No. 15-572); Salem Financial v. United States, petition for cert. filed, (Sept. 29, 2015) 
(No. 15-380), cert. denied, (Mar. 7, 2016). However, the U.S. Supreme Court refused 
certiorari in these cases, thus letting the lower court victories in these cases stand. 
 216. In the legislative history to I.R.C. § 7701(o), it was stated that routine business 
transactions such as “(1) the choice between capitalizing a business enterprise with debt or 
equity; (2) a U.S. person’s choice between utilizing a foreign corporation or a domestic 
corporation to make a foreign investment; (3) the choice to enter a transaction or series of 
transactions that constitute a corporate organization or reorganization under subchapter C; 
and (4) the choice to utilize a related-party entity in a transaction, provided that the arm’s 
length standard of I.R.C. § 482 and other applicable concepts are satisfied.” See STAFF OF THE 
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF 
THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION WITH THE PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT at 379 (2011). As has been pointed out by 
Professor Luke, this legislative history provides two caveats to reliance on this safe harbor list: 
“(1) whether a particular transaction meets the requirements for specific treatment under any 
of these provisions can be a question of facts and circumstances and (2) the fact that a 
transaction does meet the requirements for specific treatment is not determinative of whether a 
transaction or series of transactions of which it is a part has economic substance. A taxpayer 
may not escape the economic substance doctrine through labeling an activity as a ‘basic 
business transaction’; the facts and circumstances must clearly show that the transaction is in 
line with existing authorities.” See Charlene Luke, The Relevance Game: Congress’s Choices for 
Economic Substance Gamemakers, 66 TAX LAW 551, 572 (2013). 
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However, section 7701(o) may do more than simply solve the 
problem prospectively, as its existence seems to be impacting the 
development of the judicially created economic substance doctrine. 
The Tax Court in Bank of New York Mellon v. Commissioner looked 
to the legislative history accompanying section 7701(o) to support 
its application of the judicially created economic substance doctrine, 
thus harmonizing its pre-section 7701(o) decision with the manner 
in which the economic substance doctrine was codified in section 
7701(o).217 Other cases have refused to rule in favor of taxpayers as a 
matter of law and are proceeding to trial218 or are the subject of 
interlocutory appeals.219  
These cases in the pre-section 7701(o) era appear to be trending 
in favor of the government, and in any event the strongest 
arguments in the taxpayer’s favor are arguments that cannot be made 
in years that are subject to section 7701(o)’s restrictions. The 
government has also been successful in disallowing foreign tax 
credits when the U.S. taxpayer is a lender (not a preferred equity 
investor) with respect to a structured passive investment 
arrangement, demonstrating the effectiveness of the economic 
substance doctrine at handling variations in these highly structured 
transactions.220 Given that the generation of objectionable excess 
 
 217. See Bank of New York Mellon v. Comm’r, 140 T.C. 15, 34–35 n.8, n.9 (2013) 
supplemented by T.C. Memo. 2013-225 (2013) (Tax Court cites legislative history to I.R.C. § 
7701(o) as confirmation of the relevant cases that should be used in applying the judicially-
created economic substance doctrine). 
 218. See Wells Fargo & Co. v. United States, 2013 WL 6017366 (D. Minn. 2013). 
 219. See American Int’l Grp., Inc. v. United States, 111 A.F.T.R.2D 2013-1472 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (court stated that the economic substance doctrine’s purpose is “to 
determine whether AIG merely sought to minimize its tax burden on otherwise profitable 
spread banking activity, or whether the spread between AIG’s cost of borrowing and its return 
on investment existed only because of the transactions’ tax consequences including its 
negotiated division of its inherent tax benefits”). The district court did allow the case to 
proceed on an interlocutory appeal. See American Int’l Group, Inc. v. United States, 112 
A.F.T.R.2d 2013-7206 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 220. In Pritired, the taxpayer was disallowed more than $20 million in foreign tax credits 
generated in a highly structured transaction involving a $300 million payment to two French 
banks. The court ruled against the taxpayer on multiple grounds, finding that the transaction 
was a loan rather than an equity investment (thus no I.R.C. §902 credits were available), that 
the transaction lacked economic substance, that the transaction violated the partnership anti-
abuse rules of Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2, and that the transaction had no business purpose and no 
reasonable expectation of profit. See Pritired 1 LLC v. United States, No. 4:08-cv-00082, 816 
F.SUPP. 2D 693 (S.D. Iowa 2011). For a criticism of the Pritired decision, see Jasper 
Cummings, Preferred Stock and the Special Purpose Issuer, 135 TAX NOTES 1665 (July 
12, 2012). 
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foreign tax credits posited by the STARS transactions is adequately 
addressed by section 7701(o) in a principled manner, the redundant 
application of Regulation section 1.901-2(e)(5) represents needless 
complexity that should be removed. 
D. U.S. Tax Versus Foreign Tax Permanent Basis Differences and 
Section 901(m) 
An early means of generating excessive amounts of foreign tax 
credits arose in instances where foreign law defined taxable income 
in a way that was different from (and broader than) the U.S. 
definition of taxable income, thus creating a permanent tax basis 
difference between the two jurisdictions. In this situation, foreign 
taxes for the full amount were claimed by the U.S. taxpayer even 
though a significant portion of the foreign taxes related to items of 
income that were excluded from any U.S. taxation. In G.C.M. 
26062, 1949-2 C.B. 110, the IRS argued that foreign taxes assessed 
on amounts excluded from U.S. taxation should not be eligible for 
U.S. foreign tax credit relief because allowing those credits inflated 
the amount of foreign tax credits beyond what was required to avoid 
international double income taxation and generated inappropriate 
cross-crediting. The government felt that international double 
income taxation was already avoided if the United States did not 
assert taxing jurisdiction over the item that foreign law sought to tax. 
Under this view, providing a cross-crediting opportunity for taxes 
assessed on excluded income was arguably overly generous.  
This argument represented an early effort to prevent inflated 
amounts of U.S. foreign tax credit relief. However, this effort to 
deny foreign tax credit relief for taxes paid on items that would never 
be part of the U.S. tax base was largely rejected by the courts.221 
Consequently, after largely failing to convince courts to engage in a 
facts and circumstances inquiry to determine whether foreign tax 
credit relief was appropriate as a precondition to the grant of such 
 
 221. See Helvering v. Nell, 139 F.2d 865, 870−71 (4th Cir. 1944); I.B. Dexter v. 
Comm’r, 47 B.T.A. 285, 290−91 (1942), acq., 1948-2 C.B. 1; Brace v. Comm’r, 11 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 906, 907, T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 52, 265, at 800–01 (1952); United States v. Rexach, 200 
F. Supp. 494, 496 (D.P.R. 1961) (considering the argument raised by the Service that the 
foreign tax credit is allowed only for items subject to U.S. tax an “extinct question”). But see 
Hubbard v. United States, 17 F. Supp. 93 (Ct. Cl. 1936) (ruling in favor of the IRS that 
foreign tax credits should not be allowed to the extent assessed on amounts that were not 
taxable in the United States). 
1895 The Foreign Tax Credit War 
 1957 
relief under section 901, the IRS in 1954 abandoned its arguments 
that foreign tax credit relief should only be available when true 
international double income taxation was possible with respect to the 
underlying item that was assessed a foreign tax.222 Here things 
remained until 2010. 
Congress eventually reacted to the cross-crediting opportunities 
afforded by tax basis differences with the enactment of section 
901(m).223 In general, section 901(m)(1) denies U.S. foreign tax 
credit relief for any foreign taxes attributable to the disqualified 
portion of foreign income arising in a covered asset acquisition. 
Section 901(m)(2) provides that a covered asset acquisition includes 
any transaction that is treated as an asset acquisition for U.S. tax 
purposes but is treated as a stock purchase for foreign income tax 
purposes. Thus, section 901(m) can apply in instances where (i) 
stock in a foreign entity is sold and a section 338 election is made, 
(ii) stock in a foreign entity is sold and the foreign entity is 
considered a disregarded entity for U.S. tax purposes, or (iii) an 
interest in a foreign entity is sold and the foreign entity is treated as a 
partnership for U.S. tax purposes.224 Section 901(m)(3)(a) provides 
that the disqualified portion of foreign taxes is the incremental 
foreign income tax paid as a result of a permanent tax basis 
difference.225 The purpose of section 901(m) is to deny foreign tax 
credit relief for foreign taxes imposed on foreign income that is not 
taxable in the United States. This occurs under the theory that 
international double income taxation is already avoided due to the 
 
 222. The Service formally abandoned this position in Rev. Rul. 54-15, 1954-1 C.B. 129; 
see also Treas. Reg. § 1.904-6(a)(1)(iv) (places foreign tax credit for items not subject to U.S. 
tax in the general basket, thus accepting their creditability and placing them in the basket that 
provides the most protection against the cross-crediting phenomenon). 
 223. See PUB. L. 111-226, §212 (Aug. 11, 2010). 
 224. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, “Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of 
the Senate Amendment to the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 1586, 
Scheduled for Consideration by the House of Representatives on August 10, 2010, JCX-46-10 
(Aug. 10, 2010) at 10. 
 225. I.R.C. § 901(m)(3)(A) achieves this by stating that the disqualified portion means 
the ratio of the aggregate percentage basis differences allocable to such taxable year divided by 
the income which the foreign tax is applied. I.R.C. § 901(m)(3)(C)(i) provides that the basis 
difference means the excess of the adjusted basis of such asset immediately after a covered asset 
acquisition over the adjusted basis of such asset immediately before the covered asset 
acquisition. I.R.C. § 901(m)(3)(B)(i) provides the general rule that the basis difference will be 
allocated to taxable years using the applicable recovery method for U.S income tax purposes. 
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nontaxability of the particular item that was subjected to foreign 
taxation. The illustration below sets forth the analysis: 
Illustration #1. USP purchases the stock of a foreign target (FT) 
for $100. FT made substantial use of its assets in its trade or 
business. The inside basis in the assets is $40. USP makes a section 
338(g) election, thus stepping up the basis of the assets for U.S. tax 
purposes. However, no basis step-up exists for local tax purposes as 
the transaction is treated as a stock purchase for local tax purposes. 
Assume that the additional $60 of basis step-up is amortized over a 
15-year period ($4 of additional amortization annually). Assume 
that FT has $24 of income (before the additional amortization) 
and pays a foreign tax at a 25% tax rate, so on these facts FT pays a 
total of $6 of local income tax. Consequently, in this situation, $4 
of the $24 of FT’s income will never be subject to U.S. taxation 
due to the $4 of additional amortization deductions, and so the 
corresponding $1 of foreign tax assessed on this excluded $4 of 
income need not be given foreign tax credit relief because double 
taxation is already avoided on the $4 of foreign income to which 
this $1 of tax relates. Thus, section 901(m) disallows the $1 of 
foreign tax that is attributable to the income that is sheltered by 
reason of the amortization of the tax basis difference that was 
created by reason of the covered asset acquisition.226 
The justification for section 901(m) harkens back to the policy 
arguments first expressed in G.C.M. 26062. For U.S. tax purposes, 
the assets in Illustration #1 experience a basis step-up in a transaction 
where no foreign taxable event occurred. The amortization of this 
additional stepped-up basis creates a permanent reduction in the 
portion of foreign income that will be taxed in the United States 
versus what will be subject to tax in the foreign jurisdiction where no 
basis step-up was provided. Thus, in this situation, for U.S. tax 
purposes the buyer can obtain a basis step-up in the underlying FT 
assets in a transaction where the seller was not subject to a taxable 
event in a foreign jurisdiction, creating a permanent basis difference 
between the United States and the relevant foreign jurisdiction. The 
foreign taxes associated with the excluded income (by reason of the 
additional U.S. amortization deduction) are disallowed under 
section 901(m) because international double income taxation is 
 
 226. For a further analysis of the interplay between I.R.C. § 901(m) and I.R.C. § 338(g), 
see Lowell Yoder, Section 338(g) Election for a Foreign Tax Continues to Provide Benefits to 
Buyer After New Section 901(m), 40 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 347 (June 10, 2011). 
1895 The Foreign Tax Credit War 
 1959 
already avoided with respect to the particular item of income to 
which those taxes relate. In the context of this “one-sided taxable 
transaction,” it seems appropriate to prevent the buyer from 
benefitting from both an asset step-up (that created no tax 
consequence to the seller) and also from allowing all U.S. foreign tax 
credits. Section 901(m), therefore, arguably prevents a U.S. tax 
benefit that is beyond what is necessary to simply prevent double 
international income taxation. 
However, even though the core theory behind section 901(m) 
can be rationalized to achieve an appropriate outcome, the actual 
breadth of section 901(m) creates instances where it inappropriately 
disallows U.S. foreign tax credit relief. This is particularly true when 
the seller in the transaction is a U.S. corporation or a controlled 
foreign corporation of a U.S. corporation and a section 338(g) 
election has been made. Illustration #2 sets forth the relevant issues: 
Illustration #2. The facts are the same as Illustration #1 except 
now it is assumed that the seller of FT is a U.S. corporation or a 
controlled foreign corporation that is wholly owned by a U.S. 
corporation (hereafter, “U.S. Seller”). USP makes a section 338(g) 
election. USP and the U.S. Seller report the transaction 
consistently as a deemed asset sale for U.S. tax purposes. 
In Illustration #2, the U.S. Seller’s tax consequences with respect 
to the deemed asset sale will be consistently reported to the United 
States government. The United States asserts the right to subject the 
U.S. Seller’s income on this deemed asset sale to U.S. net income 
taxation227 with the cross-crediting opportunity limited due to 
section 338(h)(16).228 Given that the United States is a relevant 
 
 227. Since § 338(h)(16) treats the gain on the deemed asset sale as a gain arising from a 
stock transaction, the gain is passive foreign personal holding company income if earned in the 
hands of a controlled foreign corporation, so it will be subject to immediate U.S. taxation even 
if the U.S. Seller is a controlled foreign corporation. See § 954(c). 
 228. Under § 338(h)(16), the seller’s additional § 1248 amount resulting from the 
seller’s deemed asset sale arising from a regular § 338(g) election cannot be treated as general 
basket foreign-source income but is instead sourced based on the sourcing rules for capital 
gain on the sale of the stock which results in this gain either being US-sourced (the result 
generally afforded if the U.S. Seller were a U.S. corporation) or passive basket foreign-source 
income (the result if the U.S. Seller were a controlled foreign corporation). See § 865(a) and 
(f). Either way, cross crediting is prevented either by § 904(a) when the U.S. Seller is a U.S. 
corporation or by treating the income as passive basket income per § 904(d)(2) when the U.S. 
Seller is a controlled foreign corporation. See Reg. § 1.338-4(h)(8) Ex. 4; see also Kevin Dolan, 
Philip Tretiak, & Ronald Dabrowski, U.S. Taxation of International Mergers, Acquisitions, and 
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jurisdiction of both the USP and U.S. Seller in Illustration #2, and 
because the U.S. tax laws restrict the cross-crediting options with 
respect to the U.S. Seller’s taxable gain (via section 338(h)(16)), it is 
inappropriate to deny U.S. foreign tax credits to USP by reason of 
section 901(m). Viewed from an overall perspective, the basis step-
up afforded to USP represents only a timing difference, not a 
permanent basis difference, since USP’s basis step-up was created in 
a transaction where the U.S. Seller’s gain was subject to U.S. net 
income taxation. Thus, the extra amortization deductions afforded 
to USP represent only the other side of a transaction where the U.S. 
Seller was subject to U.S. net income taxation with respect to its 
deemed asset sale. 
Section 901(m)(7) grants broad authority to the Treasury 
Department to modify the application of section 901(m) to avoid 
inappropriate foreign tax credit disallowance results. It states that the 
Treasury Department “may issue regulations or other guidance as is 
necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of [section 
901(m)], including to provide . . . an exemption for certain covered 
asset acquisitions.”229 The legislative history indicates the 
following  context: 
In cases in which there has been a covered asset acquisition that 
involves either (1) both U.S. assets and relevant foreign assets, or 
(2) assets in multiple relevant jurisdictions, it is anticipated that the 
Secretary may issue regulations clarifying the manner in which any 
relevant foreign asset (such as intangible assets that may relate to 
more than one jurisdiction) are to be allocated between 
those jurisdictions. 
Congress recognized that its promulgation of section 901(m) 
might be overbroad and potentially provide inappropriate results, so 
 
Joint Ventures at ¶2.03[2][b] (WG&L updated Nov. 2014). For an analysis of how section 
338(h)(16) can create results that are harsher when the total earnings and profits in the 
controlled foreign corporation exceed the seller’s gain with the consequence that the seller 
would be entitled to less deemed paid credits than would otherwise be available if no section 
338 election were made, see Lowell D. Yoder, CFC Target: To Make or Not to Make a Code Sec. 
338 Election, 3 J. TAX’N OF GLOBAL TRANS. 3 (Winter 2004); Lowell D. Yoder, CCA 
200103031: Does §338(h)(16) Apply to Deemed-Paid Credits?, 30 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 443 
(Oct. 12, 2001). 
 229. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, Technical Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of 
the Senate Amendment to the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 1586, 
Scheduled for Consideration by the House of Representatives on August 10, 2010, JCX-46-10 
at 16 (Aug. 10, 2010). 
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it was careful to delegate regulatory authority to the Treasury 
Department to address any inappropriate application of section 
901(m). The Treasury Department should use its delegated 
authority under section 901(m)(7) to promulgate regulations to 
exempt from section 901(m)’s disallowance rules any stock 
transaction between USP and the U.S. Seller that is treated as a 
deemed asset acquisition by reason of section 338 where the seller is 
a U.S. Seller. In this context, the “relevant foreign jurisdiction” is in 
fact the United States because the United States has jurisdiction to 
assert taxation over both USP and the U.S. Seller, thus ensuring that 
the basis step-up arises in a transaction that affords consistent 
treatment toward both the buyer and the seller side of the 
transaction in the relevant jurisdiction of each. 
The United States has ensured (via section 338(h)(16)) that this 
regular section 338(g) election has not afforded an inappropriate 
cross-crediting opportunity for the U.S. Seller. Also, the U.S. Seller’s 
gain is subject to immediate U.S. taxation. For these two reasons, 
the facts set forth in Illustration #2 indicate that the U.S. tax system 
does not suffer a distortion from an overall perspective because there 
is no “one-sided taxable event.” Said differently, because the United 
States is a “relevant jurisdiction” on both the buyer and the seller 
side of the transaction and has taken steps to limit the cross-crediting 
opportunities afforded to the U.S. Seller, there is no inappropriate 
foreign tax credit benefit generated from a US tax policy perspective 
in this situation. Consequently, in this context, any “double benefit” 
afforded to USP in this Illustration #2 is offset by the fact that the 
U.S. Seller must consistently treat this taxable event as a deemed 
asset sale for U.S. tax purposes, and is ultimately subject to U.S. 
taxing jurisdiction on this transaction. Given this symmetrical 
treatment, it seems inappropriate to disallow foreign tax credit relief 
in this fact pattern as USP’s basis step-up is simply a timing 
difference, not a permanent difference, from the overall U.S. tax 
regime’s perspective. 
A harder conceptual case exists if the facts are slightly revised 
as follows: 
Illustration #3. The facts are the same as Illustration #2 except 
that no section 338 election is made and FT is treated as a 
disregarded entity for U.S. tax purposes. The U.S. Seller sells all 
the stock of the disregarded entity to USP. 
In this fact pattern, USP again is treated as having purchased the 
underlying assets of FT for U.S. tax purposes, and thus USP is 
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afforded a stepped-up basis in the underlying FT assets. The U.S. 
Seller is subject to this same consistent deemed asset sale 
characterization for U.S. tax purposes. Thus, as in Illustration #2, 
the United States is a “relevant jurisdiction” that is asserting at least 
residual taxing jurisdiction on both the buyer and the seller in this 
transaction. However, unlike Illustration #2, now the U.S. Seller’s 
taxable gain is not subject to the restrictions of section 
338(h)(16).230 In the context of the facts set forth in Illustration #3, 
the U.S. Seller’s gain is likely to be considered low-tax foreign-
source general basket income.231 Thus, U.S. taxation over this 
deemed asset gain is preserved only on a residual basis and affords 
the U.S. Seller with a potential cross-crediting opportunity (via the 
generation of low-tax general basket income that can utilize excess 
credits from other transactions).232  
In addition, just as in Illustration #2, USP is likely to generate 
excess foreign tax credits as a result of the amortization of the 
permanent basis difference. So, Illustration #3 raises the question of 
whether section 901(m) is principally bothered about the “one-sided 
nature” of a deemed asset acquisition (asset basis step-up to the 
buyer without consistent taxable asset sale characterization in the 
seller’s relevant taxing jurisdiction) or whether section 901(m) is 
concerned about cross-crediting opportunities for USP (via excess 
credits generated) in transactions where the U.S. Seller is afforded 
generous cross-crediting opportunities with respect to its deemed 
asset gain. Comments have been submitted to the Treasury 
 
 230. The Treasury Department has recommended that the principles of section 
338(h)(16) should be extended to apply to all covered asset acquisitions described in section 
901(m). See TREASURY DEPARTMENT, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S 
FISCAL YEAR 2016 REVENUE PROVISIONS at 30–31 (Feb. 2016). 
 231. Because the asset gain relates to assets sold that are used in the active conduct of a 
trade or business, the gain is not characterized as foreign personal holding company income 
under section 954(c). See Treas. Reg. § 1.954-2(e)(1)(ii). Furthermore, because assets in 
Illustration #1 are assets used in a trade or business (and thus do not give rise to rents and 
royalties), the sale of these assets will be exempted from the foreign base company sales rules 
regardless of how these assets were originally acquired. See Treas. Reg. § 1.943-3(a). Thus, the 
gain, if recognized in a controlled foreign corporation, is not likely to be subject to subpart F 
taxation. Finally, because the gain from this transaction is not described in section 954(c), the 
gain will all be placed in LuxCo’s general basket. See § 904(d)(2)(A)(i) and (B)(i). For a 
further analysis of this planning strategy, see Kevin Dolan, Philip Tretiak, & Ronald 
Dabrowski, U.S. Taxation of International Mergers, Acquisitions, and Joint Ventures at 
¶2.01[4] (WG&L updated Nov. 2014). 
 232. See § 904(d)(1). 
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Department that posit this situation and indicate that competing 
policy claims can be made on whether section 901(m) should apply 
in this context.233 The legislative history is unclear on what the 
fundamental policy objective is, and so the Treasury Department 
should articulate clearly what the fundamental result is in this 
Illustration #3. 
III. RECONSTRUCTING SECTION 901 FOR THE POST-WAR ERA 
Section 901’s complexity was a result of a legitimate concern. 
The foreign tax credit war was a real war. The threats posed by 
transactions that artificially generate excess foreign tax credits 
represent real policy problems. Since at least 1975, Congress and the 
Treasury Department have been convinced that the cross-crediting 
phenomenon arising from “objectionable transactions” requires a 
response in addition to simple reliance on section 904. Thus, it is 
understandable that Congress and the Treasury Department would 
seek to redefine the foreign tax credit eligibility standards in response 
to transactions where foreign tax credits are generated in 
objectionable ways. The dual capacity taxpayer regulations of 
Regulation section 1.901-2A, the codified economic substance 
doctrine contained in section 7701(o), and section 901(m)’s 
disallowance of taxes attributable to permanent tax basis differences 
together represent a principled approach to the inappropriate 
generation of excess foreign tax credits. These provisions were 
needed, and they solved real problems. 
However, this is the extent to which positive things can be said. 
The historical record indicates that Congress and the Treasury 
Department ran roughshod over section 901 and used a scorched 
earth approach in their war against objectionable foreign tax credit 
transactions. The resulting carnage has caused the U.S. foreign tax 
credit regime to become a “byzantine structure of staggering 
complexity.”234 The rush to enact reforms resulted in ill-conceived 
regulations. The separate limitation regime of section 907, the 
formalistic aspects of the predominant character standard in 
Regulation section 1.901-2(b), the selectively applied minimum 
holding period requirements of sections 901(k) and (l), and the 
 
 233. See New York Bar Association, Report on Section 901(m) at 15–16 (Jan. 28, 2011). 
 234. See supra note 24. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2016 
1964 
noncompulsory payment criteria for structured passive investment 
arrangements in Regulation section 1.901-2(e)(5) represent a 
plethora of redundant and obsolete complexity. Even worse, because 
these redundant, ad hoc provisions were not targeted in scope, they 
create incoherent instances of international double income taxation, 
even when the underlying transactions are not objectionable.  
The occurrence of international double income taxation is an 
incoherent outcome when the taxpayer has substantively paid foreign 
income taxes in a non-objectionable transaction and yet is denied 
U.S. foreign tax credit relief. The United States government 
continues to assert worldwide residency-based taxation (either on a 
current or deferred basis), and thus must have a coherent foreign tax 
credit regime to complement that tax policy orientation given that 
our major trading partners have chosen to enact territorial tax 
regimes that outright structurally avoid international double income 
taxation outcomes. For that reason, the overbroad and redundant 
foreign tax credit disallowance provisions should be removed, 
especially considering that Congress and the Treasury Department 
have enacted more targeted responses that work without the need 
for these additional provisions. 
With more and more countries adopting territorial tax regimes, 
the United States simply must have a principled and coherent foreign 
tax credit regime that balances the need to prevent international 
double income taxation with the need to prevent the generation of 
artificially excessive amounts of foreign tax credits through 
objectionable transactions. Objectionable foreign tax credit 
transactions that generate excessive and artificial amounts of U.S. 
foreign tax credit relief needed principled responses, and principled 
responses were enacted in the midst of a scattergun attack on these 
objectionable transactions. But, now that these historic issues are 
adequately addressed, it is time, in this post-war era, to remove the 
ad hoc and redundant bulwarks that were added to section 901 in 
the foreign tax credit war. Those provisions create a significant risk of 
incoherent outcomes and unjust instances of international double 
income taxation. As countries evolve and adapt their tax laws to 
protect against the BEPS phenomenon, their adoption of formulary 
measures and disallowance rules create the risk of needless and 
inappropriate amounts of double international income taxation 
under the existing 1983 final regulations. The U.S. foreign tax credit 
regime must be overhauled, and now is the time to clean up this 
important area of the law so that U.S. multinational enterprises do 
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not suffer international double income taxation on income that has 
already been subject to foreign income taxes in non-
objectionable situations. 
 
